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THE LOOMING CRISIS IN ANTITRUST ECONOMICS
HERBERT HOVENKAMP*

ABSTRACT
As in so many areas of law and politics in the United States, antitrust’s center
is at bay. On the right, it is besieged by those who would further limit its reach.
On the left, it faces revisionists who propose significantly greater enforcement.
One thing the two extremes share, however, is the denigration of the role of
economics in antitrust analysis. Two of the Supreme Court’s recent antitrust
decisions at this writing reveal that economic analysis from the right no longer
occupies the central role that it once had. On the left, some proposals display
indifference to their economic impact on important participants in the economy.
The antitrust laws speak of the conduct they prohibit in economic terms, such
as “restraint of trade,” “monopoly,” and lessening of “competition.” They do
not embrace any particular economic ideology, such as the Chicago school or
institutionalism. Nor do they require the use of any particular economic model,
such as perfect competition or oligopoly. This openness gives policy makers a
great deal of room, but it is not an invitation to economic nonsense. Further,
economics should not be a tool for picking a winning interest group and then
manipulating the doctrine to get that result.
The Supreme Court’s 2019 Apple decision slighted the economics of passedon consumer harm, a central component in analyzing private damages actions
for more than forty years, and one that is critical to measuring competitive
injury. In AmEx, the Court neglected the kind of transactional analysis that
would have uncovered the true injuries in that case, defined the “relevant
market” in such a way as to make that term economically incoherent, rejected a
superior methodology for assessing power in favor of an inferior one,
misunderstood completely the meaning and appropriate scope of free riding,
and lost sight of the fact that marginal rather than total effects are central.
Although the progressive wing of antitrust does a better job of identifying the
problems that the competitive economy faces, some of its proposed solutions are
calculated to make them worse. The pursuit of business concentration or bigness
for its own sake will injure both consumers and labor far more than it benefits
small business, who appear to be the intended beneficiaries. A proposal to forbid
large platforms from selling their own products in competition with the products
of others will harm both consumers and most small businesses, although it will
benefit some large firms.
*
James G. Dinan University Professor, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School and
the Wharton School.

489

490

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101:489

When used correctly and without excessive ideology, economics is a powerful,
neutral tool for helping people identify injuries to competition and appropriate
fixes. Indeed, that is the first and best use of antitrust economics. Both extremes
in this debate have ignored the first rule of rational antitrust policy: figure out
who is getting hurt, and how.
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INTRODUCTION
As in so many areas of law and politics in the United States, antitrust’s center
is at bay. It is besieged by a right flank that wants to limit antitrust further. On
the left, it faces revisionists who propose significantly greater enforcement.
One thing the two extremes share is the denigration of the role of economics
in antitrust analysis. The Supreme Court is increasingly revealing that
fundamental economic analysis no longer occupies the central role that it once
had. On the left, some proposals are economically indefensible and threaten
antitrust’s boundary limitations to concerns about economic competition.
The antitrust laws speak of the conduct they prohibit in unmistakably
economic terms, such as “restraint of trade,” “monopoly,” and lessening of
“competition.”1 They do not embrace any particular economic ideology, such as
the Chicago school or institutionalism. Nor do they require the use of any
particular economic model, such as perfect competition or oligopoly. This
openness gives policy makers a great deal of room, but it is not an invitation to
economic nonsense. Antitrust economics should be an analytic and empirical
tool for determining how a practice affects competition. This requires an
assessment of whom a practice injures and how, as well as what is the optimal
form of relief. Antitrust economics should not become an excuse for picking a
winning interest group and then manipulating the doctrine to get to that result.
Nor, however, should it be a tool for making other kinds of social policy that is
not driven by concerns about competition.
This Article first considers the relationship between sound antitrust
economics and the trajectory of antitrust decisions over time. Then it briefly
examines the role of economics as a science in antitrust analysis. Next, it turns
to the Supreme Court’s treatment of antitrust economics in two recent decisions
at this writing. Finally, it looks at the sharply contrasting approaches of some on
antitrust’s left flank.
A.

The Marginal Antitrust Case
In the 1960s, the economics of Supreme Court antitrust decisions was
indefensible. To be sure, much of the industrial economics of the period was
more interventionist than it is today. For example, structuralism as presented in
the writings of prominent industrial organization economists, such as Joe Bain,
argued for condemning mergers or exclusionary practices that would not be
condemned today.2 By today’s standards, the then-dominant structure-conduct-

1
These terms are used in the two substantive sections of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12; and Sections 2, 3, and 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-14, 18.
2
See, e.g., JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND
CONSEQUENCES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 21-24 (1962) (discussing value of condition
of entry to firm); JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 174 (1959); Joe S. Bain, Conditions
of Entry and the Emergence of Monopoly, in MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION AND THEIR
REGULATION 215, 219-26 (Edward H. Chamberlin ed., 1954); Joe S. Bain, Workable
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performance (“S-C-P”) paradigm exaggerated the threats posed by large firms
and concentrated markets.3
Nevertheless, the position taken in many Supreme Court decisions during that
era went far beyond this economics by any reasonable bounds. Notable examples
were the Supreme Court’s use of merger law to condemn efficiencies rather than
higher prices;4 its aggressive position on vertical restraints, particularly nonprice
restraints5 and maximum resale price maintenance;6 its application of the per se
rule to efficient and economically harmless joint ventures;7 and its exaggerated
perceptions about the relationship between intellectual property (“IP”) and
monopoly.8
While there were also important political changes,9 the Chicago school
acquired its prominence in antitrust economics because the case law provided so
Competition in Oligopoly: Theoretical Considerations and Some Empirical Evidence, 40 AM.
ECON. REV. 35, 37-38 (1950).
3
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL
THOUGHT, 1870–1970, at 206-19 (2015) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP, OPENING OF AMERICAN
LAW]; Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890–1955, 94
MINN. L. REV. 311, 312 (2009). On the role of structure in antitrust analysis today, see
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE § 1.7 (6th ed. 2020) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY]
(discussing how the S-C-P paradigm provided support for challenging mergers solely on basis
of market structure without requiring consideration of specific kinds of conduct). On merger
law in particular, see Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market
Structure, and Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996 (2018). See also Thomas E. Kauper,
Influence of Conservative Economic Analysis on the Development of the Law of Antitrust, in
HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 40 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008).
4
See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (condemning a
merger on very small market shares, largely because of its economic integration and
efficiency effects).
5
See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967) (finding
that vertical nonprice restraints are “so obviously destructive of competition that their mere
existence is enough” to violate the Sherman Act).
6
See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968) (holding that maximum
price-fixing agreement is per se illegal restraint of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act).
7
See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 598, 608 (1972) (applying
Sherman Act to condemn territorial division among cooperative association of small- and
medium-sized regional supermarket chains that lacked market power).
8
See, e.g., Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1964) (“[A] patentee’s use of a royalty
agreement that projects beyond the expiration date of the patent is unlawful per se.”); United
States v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962) (condemning block-booking of motion pictures
under per se rule after concluding that copyright creates a presumption of sufficient market
power).
9
In particular, President Lyndon Johnson’s decision not to run and President Richard
Nixon’s election as president in 1968 had the effect of turning antitrust policy sharply to the
right, particularly on issues relating to merger policy and industrial concentration. See Herbert
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much low-hanging fruit.10 Many economists climbed on board simply because
the economics reflected in antitrust decisions was indefensible.11
Since that time, however, antitrust case law has moved sharply to the right.
The Supreme Court has considerably increased plaintiffs’ burdens for pleading12
and avoiding summary judgment in antitrust cases.13 It has narrowed private
plaintiff antitrust standing14 and seriously limited challenges to predatory and
other strategic pricing.15 To the extent that courts, including the Supreme Court,
have erred in recent years, it has been in ways that favor nonenforcement. Recent
judicial applications of antitrust statutes are much narrower than the statutory
language, which speaks in broad terms about the harms they prohibit and grant
private actions to anyone who is injured. As a result, the “marginal” antitrust
case today is far, far less likely to be an expression of overdeterrence.16 Many
members of the federal judiciary, including some on the Supreme Court, now
exhibit a strong antienforcement bias.17

Hovenkamp, Introduction to the Neal Report and the Crisis in Antitrust, 5 COMPETITION
POL’Y INT’L 227, 228 (2009).
10
See Herbert Hovenkamp & Fiona Scott Morton, Framing the Chicago School of
Antitrust Analysis, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1843, 1849-50 (2020) (highlighting how Chicago
school’s call to use economics in antitrust analysis yielded less enforcement and increased
consumer welfare and efficiency).
11
Id. at 1848-49 (“The attractive feature of the [Chicago school] movement was not the
ideology of less enforcement regardless of the facts, but rather the idea of using economics to
analyze business conduct in an effort to maximize social welfare. The economics angle was
the marketing genius of the Chicago School . . . .”).
12
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 548-49 (2007) (holding that complaint
under Section 1 of Sherman Act cannot survive a motion to dismiss when it alleges parallel
conduct unfavorable to competition without “factual context suggesting agreement, as distinct
from identical, independent action”).
13
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (“[I]f
the factual context renders [plaintiffs’] claim implausible—if the claim is one that simply
makes no economic sense—[plaintiffs] must come forward with more persuasive evidence to
support their claim than would otherwise be necessary [to survive a motion for summary
judgment].”).
14
See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 118-19, (1986); Associated
Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 545 (1983);
Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 729 (1977). On Illinois Brick, see infra text
accompanying notes 87-91.
15
See generally Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S.
312 (2007); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
16
See infra note 102 and accompanying text (highlighting law’s significant
underdeterrence in price-fixing context).
17
Letter from author to Hon. David N. Cicilline, Chair, Subcomm. on Antitrust, Com. &
Admin. L., and Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Ranking Member, Subcomm. on Antitrust,
Com. & Admin. L. (Apr. 17, 2020) (on file with author) (providing rule of reason cases as an
example of the federal judiciary’s antienforcement bias).
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At the same time, changes in both economic theory and economic
methodology have strengthened the case for intervention on economic grounds.
Important characteristics of the Chicago school in the 1950s and 1960s were an
iconoclastic methodology, severe opposition to economic models that deviated
significantly from perfect competition, and extreme trust that in the long run all
markets would work themselves to competition.18 George Stigler, the most
notable Chicago school microeconomist of the period, saw oligopoly as a narrow
and usually transient exception to perfect competition19 and, along with Milton
Friedman, repudiated the theory of monopolistic competition as untestable.20
Within the scientific positivism of the day, that repudiation was tantamount to
saying that the theory of monopolistic competition lay outside the boundaries of
science.21
For the Chicago school, these were important defensive positions. The school
had developed in large part as a reaction to perceived situational excesses in the
economic policies of the 1930s and the New Deal.22 Stigler in particular objected
to the use of economics to respond to external circumstances such as urban
renewal or oil embargoes.23 Indeed, he wrote, the strength of economics as a
science is that its main focus is “not drawn from immediate, changing events.”24

18
See Jan Horst Keppler, The Genesis of ‘Positive Economics’ and the Rejection of
Monopolistic Competition Theory: A Methodological Debate, 22 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 261,
274 (1998) (discussing Chicago school’s reaction to monopolistic competition theory).
19
See generally George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964).
20
See GEORGE J. STIGLER, Monopolistic Competition in Retrospect, in FIVE LECTURES ON
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 12 (1949) [hereinafter STIGLER, Monopolistic Competition] (criticizing
Edward Chamberlin’s theory of monopolistic competition); see also CRAIG FREEDMAN, IN
SEARCH OF THE TWO-HANDED ECONOMIST: IDEOLOGY, METHODOLOGY AND MARKETING IN
ECONOMICS 274 (2016) (noting that Stigler criticized Chamberlin’s theory for being
“[i]nherently inapplicable,” “[t]heoretically inconsistent,” “[i]ncapable of providing any
additional insights or different results than perfect competition,” and “[d]eficient in showing
the methodological advantage of pursuing more realistic assumptions”). On Friedman’s
argument that monopolistic competition is untestable, see MILTON FRIEDMAN, The
Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3, 15 (1953).
21
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 20, at 8-9 (“Only factual evidence can show whether [a
theory] is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ or, better, tentatively ‘accepted’ as valid or ‘rejected.’ . . . [T]he
only relevant test of the validity of a hypothesis is comparison of its predictions with
experience.”).
22
See Hovenkamp & Morton, supra note 10, at 1854 (highlighting Chicago school’s
“suspicion of the aggressive antitrust policy of the New Deal” and “general assault on New
Deal regulatory policy, with its sector-specific agencies and diverse approaches for different
markets”).
23
George J. Stigler, The Influence of Events and Policies on Economic Theory, 50 AM.
ECON. REV. 36, 38 (1960) [hereinafter Stigler, Influence of Events] (analogizing leading
economists responding to urban renewal and oil embargoes to leading chemists working on
detergents or headache remedies).
24
Id.
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Stigler also objected to efforts to make economics more interdisciplinary—
suggesting, for example, that theories of oligopoly were fundamentally about the
sociology of groups.25 A good example is Stigler’s very influential essay on the
economics of information.26 Rather than looking for biological, cultural,
psychological, or sociological explanations for the fact that people often act on
incomplete or even false information, Stigler found the answer entirely in
neoclassical marginal analysis.27 Information is costly.28 As a result, a rational
maximizing actor will not acquire an infinite amount of it but rather only acquire
it to the point that the marginal value of obtaining further information equals the
marginal cost of doing so.29
Another example is an article Stigler wrote with Gary Becker about individual
taste.30 They argued, contrary to those who observed wide differences in
individual taste, that these differences were relatively unimportant for purposes
of economic analysis: “[O]ne may usefully treat tastes as stable over time and
similar among people . . . .”31 Within their model, the function of advertising
was not to influence people’s tastes but rather to communicate information about
price.32 While Stigler and Becker did not mention monopolistic competition and
product differentiation, they were clearly resisting the attempt to describe market
behavior in terms of differential consumer preferences. Although individuals’
heterogeneity might concern the other social sciences, assumptions about
individuals’ homogeneity drove economics. For Stigler, this was important to
maintaining the autonomy of economics as a science. He wrote,
[A]utonomy of a science is surely essential to its existence. A discipline
which was in intimate and continuous dependence upon the current output
of events or other disciplines would simply not be a discipline; it would be
a temporary collection of subjects. It could have no specialists—who
would be pathetically obsolete in a few years—nor any accumulated
theoretical corpus, for its theory would change with each new liaison or
external development.33

25

See id. at 45.
See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 213 (1961)
(analyzing ascertainment of market price as problem of information).
27
Id. at 215 (“Whatever the precise distribution of prices [of a commodity], it is certain
that increased search will yield diminishing returns as measured by the expected reduction in
the minimum asking price.”).
28
Id. at 216 (“The cost of search, for a consumer, may be taken as approximately
proportional to the number of (identified) sellers approached, for the chief cost is time.”).
29
Id.
30
George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON.
REV. 76, 76 (1977) (rejecting traditional view that economic analysis ends upon reaching
difference in tastes between people and yields to other subjects).
31
Id.
32
Id. at 84.
33
Stigler, Influence of Events, supra note 23, at 45.
26
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Further, Stigler argued, the technical apparatus that the classical political
economists had developed was the best not only for its own time but also for the
present.34 For him, the history of economics was little more than a series of
refinements in the theory of perfect competition. What he wrote was wishful
thinking even at that time, but much more so today:
[T]he concept of perfect competition has defeated its newer rivals in the
decisive area: the day-to-day work of the economic theorist. Since the
1930’s, when the rival doctrines of imperfect and monopolistic competition
were in their heyday, economists have increasingly reverted to the use of
the concept of perfect competition as their standard model for analysis.
Today the concept of perfect competition is being used more widely by the
profession in its theoretical work than at any time in the past. The vitality
of the concept is strongly spoken for by this triumph.35
That concept was strongly dedicated to developing a model for an economy
that worked by itself, with little or no intervention by the state. Products
competed on price within that model, and entry was usually regarded as easy
unless the state itself imposed barriers.36 As a result, the strong case that
members of the Chicago school made for nonintervention rested on the premise
that markets would always revert to competition if left alone. To this, the popular
models of imperfect competition were idiosyncratic and short-lived
annoyances.37
One source of Stigler’s hostility toward monopolistic competition theory is
that it invited the methods of other disciplines into economic analysis.
Monopolistic competition theory was driven by assumptions that ran contrary to
classical economic orthodoxy, although they seem obvious even from casual
observation—mainly, product differentiation, differential consumer taste, and
behaviorism.38 In the process of defending these ideas, the Chicago school
became very self-referential in its methodology, largely distrusting not only
outside economists but also people from other disciplines who did not follow
along.39 Ironically, notwithstanding its devotion to Alfred Marshall, Chicago
school economics ignored or implicitly rejected Alfred Marshall’s very famous
34

See GEORGE J. STIGLER, The Classical Economics: An Alternative View, in FIVE
LECTURES ON ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, supra note 20, at 25.
35
George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL. ECON. 1,
17 (1957).
36
For a good analysis, see Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error out of “Error Cost”
Analysis: What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 8-12 (2015). See also
Richard J. Gilbert, The Role of Potential Competition in Industrial Organization, J. ECON.
PERSPS., Summer 1989, at 107.
37
See Melvin W. Reder, Chicago Economics: Permanence and Change, 20 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1, 15 n.34 (1982) (“[The Chicago school] has refused to treat the economy-wide
allocation of resources as the outcome of interaction among imperfect competitors.”).
38
See Keppler, supra note 18, at 274.
39
See id.
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definition of economics as the “ordinary business of life” whose “more
important side” was not the study of wealth but rather “a part of the study of
man.”40
Stigler himself insisted that a major shortcoming in economics was the lack
of empirical testing—something he made the subject of his 1964 presidential
address to the American Economic Association.41 He shared that view with other
notable Chicago school economists such as Ronald Coase42 and Milton
Friedman.43
Nevertheless, testing eventually proved to be the undoing of Chicago school
economics. Today, the propositions that entry into most markets is easy, that
competition is robust at all concentration levels, that oligopoly is fragile, and
that imperfect competition plays no or at least only a tiny role in the economy
have been undermined by a literature that is both theoretically sound and
empirically rich.44
This idea of reversion to a competitive status quo was the driving force behind
the “error cost” analysis developed by the Chicago school in the 1980s. If
competition is robust and if oligopoly and other models of imperfect competition
are frail and fleeting, then the market itself will correct monopoly, and there is
no need for the government to intervene.45 As a result, the social cost of a false
negative (failure to condemn) is low because the market will correct it. By
contrast, false positives tend to interfere with this natural market process of
purification.46 Richard Posner, writing as both defender and critic, argued that
the core members of the Chicago school denounced even price-fixing only for
“tactical reasons.”47 In fact, they did not regard it as a serious problem worth
enforcement resources. First, the social cost of monopoly in any event was very
small.48 Second, cartels were highly unstable and, as a result, their overall

40
1 ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 1 (1890) (“Economics is a study of
man’s actions in the ordinary business of life; it inquires how he gets his income and how he
uses it. Thus it is on the one side a study of wealth and on the other, a more important side, a
part of the study of man.”).
41
George J. Stigler, The Economist and the State, 55 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 17 (1965)
(asserting that economists have been good theorists but need to expand their empirical work).
42
See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 386 (1937).
43
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 20, at 14-15.
44
See Baker, supra note 36, at 11-14. With respect to merger policy, see Hovenkamp &
Shapiro, supra note 3 (using economic theory and evidence to support presumption that
horizontal mergers are anticompetitive).
45
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2-3, 15 (1984)
(arguing that monopoly is “self-destructive” because it always attracts entry).
46
Id.
47
Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925,
932 (1979).
48
Id. at 932-33 (citing Arnold C. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, AM.
ECON. REV., May 1954, at 77).

2021]

THE LOOMING CRISIS IN ANTITRUST ECONOMICS

499

“misallocative effects would be too slight to warrant inevitably costly public
proceedings.”49
This error cost analysis, which became conventional in Chicago school
antitrust policy, is critically dependent on the assumption that markets work
themselves pure. However, if imperfections in markets are in fact stable and
robust, making competition the more fragile state of affairs, then the error cost
analysis is precisely reversed. In that case, a false negative will tend to protect
whatever market defect was causing a competitive problem. By contrast, a false
positive will impose more competition unnecessarily, but society is still more
likely to benefit unless the error is egregious.
Today, these tables have been turned dramatically. Perfect competition has
very largely lost its place in economic modeling, except perhaps in diffuse
markets for commodities. Simple perfect competition models have given way to
models that recognize a wide variety of strategic behavior. Further, these new
models seem to be doing much better than perfect competition models in the
area of testability.50
One example is the important rise of empirical economic analysis of
consumer substitution behavior that is applied in unilateral effects theories of
merger harm. The theory is that mergers between two firms that are reasonably
adjacent in a differentiated product space will predictably yield a price increase.
This occurs because more of the sales that a single firm loses in response to a
price increase will be recaptured by the merger partner rather than other firms in
the market. In perfectly competitive markets, however, sales that are lost as a
result of a price increase are simply lost. That is, unilateral effects theory
depends on the observation that, although customers substitute among different
products in the same market in response to price changes in one, in a
differentiated market they do so at different rates.
The model of unilateral effects analysis is completely inconsistent with
perfect competition, which assumes that the cross elasticity of demand facing
different sellers in the same market is the same and extremely high. If one seller
in a market raises price unilaterally, it will immediately lose all its sales.51 If two
sellers in a perfectly competitive market merge and increase their price, they will
also lose all of their sales. By contrast, models that account for product
differentiation assume that the cross elasticities of demand between pairs of
49

Id. at 932.
See Baker, supra note 36, at 37 (arguing that conservatives’ erroneous assumptions
“systematically overstate the incidence and significance of false positives, understate the
incidence and significance of false negatives, and understate the net benefits of various rules
by overstating their costs”).
51
In a perfectly competitive market, each firm faces a horizontal residual demand curve,
meaning that it would lose all of its sales in response to a unilateral price increase. See
Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Estimating the Residual Demand Curve Facing
a Single Firm, 6 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 283, 284 (1988) (“Under perfect competition with
homogeneous products, one firm’s contraction of output will be offset exactly by another’s
expansion . . . .”).
50
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firms actually vary significantly and that these differences can be empirically
measured. As a result, it becomes possible to use the distance between firms in
product space to evaluate the price impact of a merger.52
Empirical testing requires data about the rates of substitution between pairs
of firms in response to one firm’s price change. Here, the widespread availability
of digitized transaction evidence makes this measurement much easier than it
had been previously, certainly during Stigler’s time.53 Today, the theory of
unilateral effects is robust and testable, and it accounts for a significant
percentage of government merger challenges.54 It seems clear that imperfect
competition models are durable, testable, and unlikely to go away.
B.

Ideology and Economic Science in Antitrust Policy

Disputed scientific issues present courts with questions of fact—something
that has been clear for nearly two centuries.55 The Federal Rules of Evidence
couch their treatment of expert testimony in this way, requiring the testimony to

52

On unilateral effects analysis of mergers, see HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY,
supra note 3, § 12.3d.
53
On the use of scanner data or other recorded information from digitized transactions in
merger analysis, see FTC & U.S. DOJ, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 31 (2006), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review
/commentaryonthehorizontalmergerguidelinesmarch2006.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EFS69Y92]; Carl Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just. Antitrust Div., Mergers with
Differentiated Products, Address to the Department of Justice (Nov. 9, 1995) (transcript
available at 1995 WL 678629) (describing use of scanner data in several merger cases).
54
See Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in
Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 60-85 (2010) (observing shift in merger enforcement
towards unilateral effects theory, and explaining update of DOJ’s Horizontal Merger
Guidelines). Particularly on testability, see Jonathan B. Baker, Why Did the Antitrust Agencies
Embrace Unilateral Effects?, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 31, 34-36 (2003) (observing that
unilateral effects theory can predict and empirically demonstrate unilateral price changes
resulting from mergers); Andrew R. Dick, Merger Policy Twenty-Five Years Later:
Unilateral Effects Move to the Forefront, ANTITRUST L. DEVS., Fall 2012, at 25, 25
(“Advances in economic analysis—in particular, the development of formal economic models
to analyze how mergers and acquisitions can change firms’ pricing incentives and the parallel
development of empirical methods designed to test those models—helped propel unilateral
effects to the forefront.”). For examples of the use of empirical evidence in unilateral effects
merger cases, see FTC v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 61-72 (D.D.C. 2015) (“The FTC
advanced a ‘unilateral effects’ theory to argue that the merger would harm competition in both
the national and local broadline distribution markets.”); and United States v. H & R Block,
Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 81-89 (D.D.C. 2011).
55
See Louis E. Reik, The Doe-Ray Correspondence: A Pioneer Collaboration in the
Jurisprudence of Mental Disease, 63 YALE L.J. 183, 188, 191-92 (1953); see also, e.g., FTC
v. Nat’l Urological Grp., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (“[W]hat
constitutes competent and reliable scientific evidence in this case is a question of fact for
expert interpretation.”).
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be based on “sufficient facts or data.”56 In its Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.57 decision, the Supreme Court gave as important
considerations for evaluating scientific testimony whether it can be tested or
falsified and whether a proffered theory has a known or potential rate of error.58
The leading treatise on scientific evidence emphasizes the same idea.59
To be sure, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, judges perform a
gatekeeping function in determining the admissibility of proffered scientific
evidence. But the courts have also made clear that this function is limited to
questions about the expert’s methodology, not his or her ultimate conclusion.60
It was certainly never intended to permit federal judges to turn scientific issues
into questions of law.61 Indeed, the very concept of admissibility applies only to
issues of fact.
In this regard, economics is no different from any other science. Testing its
hypotheses and models has been one of economics’ most important functions
since the 1950s,62 leading to an empirical renaissance in industrial economics in
the 1980s and after.63 Today, empirical economics and econometrics make up a
significant part of litigation concerning expert testimony.64 Antitrust litigation
in particular makes liberal use of both economic theory and economic
evidence.65 The debate over how antitrust should use economics has many
facets, and the extent to which any particular proposition of economics is

56

FED. R. EVID. 702.
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
58
Id. at 593-94; see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141-42 (1999)
(expanding application of Daubert factors to testimony of engineers).
59
DAVID L. FAIGMAN, EDWARD K. CHENG, JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, ERIN E. MURPHY,
JOSEPH SANDERS & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 1.15 (2019).
60
E.g., Kopplin v. Wis. Cent. Ltd., 914 F.3d 1099, 1103-04 (7th Cir. 2019) (“The focus is
on the expert’s methodology, not his ultimate conclusions.”).
61
Nevertheless, some factual conclusions end up becoming legal precedents. See Allison
Orr Larsen, Factual Precedents, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 79-97 (2013) (observing tendency of
lower courts to cite Supreme Court cases as authorities on factual, rather than solely legal,
subjects).
62
See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 20, at 3, 14-15.
63
Timothy F. Bresnahan & Richard Schmalensee, The Empirical Renaissance in
Industrial Economics: An Overview, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 371, 371 (1987) (discussing
developments that “revitalized empirical work in industrial economics” during the 1980s).
64
See Jeff Todd, Realistic Assumptions in Economic Models, 47 HOFSTRA L. REV. 231,
242-44 (2018).
65
See Malcolm B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, Daubert, Science, and Modern Game
Theory: Implications for Merger Analysis, 20 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 125, 153-55 (2012)
(arguing that classic microeconomic theories of competition and monopoly are sufficiently
robust to be admissible under Daubert standard). For an examination of the case law
concerning admissibility of expert economic testimony in antitrust cases, see 2 PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 309 (5th ed. forthcoming 2021).
57
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testable can be subject to dispute.66 Nevertheless, economic evidence is
concerned with questions of fact that are subject to the usual Daubert
considerations for admissibility that have become conventional for scientific
testimony.67
In its Ohio v. American Express Co.68 (“AmEx”) decision, the Supreme
Court’s majority drew two scientific conclusions as a matter of law. The first
was that market power can be established in a vertical case only indirectly, by
reference to a relevant market. The second was that, as a matter of law, a twosided platform cannot compete with a more traditional market but only with
other two-sided platforms.69 While pure questions of statutory interpretation
present questions of law,70 neither of these realistically purported to interpret the
language of the Sherman Act. The Sherman Act makes no reference whatsoever
to relevant markets or how market power is to be measured.
Further, within the discipline of economics, neither of these questions is
particularly controversial, but the Supreme Court reached the wrong answer on
both. On the first, economics has made significant strides in the last two decades
in measuring market power directly from observed transactional behavior. When
the data are available, those methodologies are superior to the traditional
approach of defining a relevant market. Further, in digital platforms such as the
one involved in the AmEx case, the data are available because all the transactions
produce digitized records.71

66

See, e.g., Donald N. McCloskey, The Loss Function Has Been Mislaid: The Rhetoric of
Significance Tests, AM. ECON. REV., May 1985, at 201, 203-04 (arguing that economists are
too easy on themselves on questions of testability); Sam Peltzman, Ronald Coase and the
Methodology of Economics, 54 J.L. & ECON. S15, S19-20 (2011) (arguing both sides).
67
A few recent examples of the application of Daubert to economic evidence in antitrust
cases include: JFM Mkt. Corp. v. SuperValu, Inc. (In re Wholesale Grocery Prods. Antitrust
Litig.), 946 F.3d 995, 1000-03 (8th Cir. 2019) (reviewing and affirming district court’s
decision to exclude expert economist testimony regarding antitrust injury under Daubert);
Am. Sales Co. v. AstraZeneca LP (In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig.), 842 F.3d
34, 65 (1st Cir. 2016) (reviewing and affirming district court’s decision to exclude expert
economist testimony regarding market entry under Daubert); ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton
Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 291-94 (3d Cir. 2012) (reviewing and affirming district court’s decision
to exclude expert economic testimony regarding damages calculations under Daubert); In re
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 322-24 (3d Cir. 2008) (reviewing district
court’s decision to consider expert economist testimony regarding market analysis under
Daubert). For more comprehensive discussion, see PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION ¶ 309 (4th ed. Supp. 2020) (ebook).
68
138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
69
Id. at 2280-81.
70
E.g., United States v. Washington, 971 F.3d 856, 861 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Statutory
interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo.”); Stephens ex rel. R.E. v. Astrue,
565 F.3d 131, 137 (4th Cir. 2009).
71
See infra text accompanying notes 207-208.
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Although the issue of proper methodology for market power measurement is
technical, it has also become politicized. In the current debate about antitrust
policy and large digital platforms, several right-wing groups have objected to
the use of econometric methods to assess power. This amounts to subordination
of science to ideology and threatens to divorce antitrust policy from economic
analysis.72 The objection is reminiscent of Stalin’s objections to the theory of
evolution and modern genetics because he regarded them as antisocialist.73
The conservatives’ objection filed with the House Judiciary Committee
neither contains nor cites any economic analysis whatsoever.74 Indeed, it never
says anything on the merits concerning methodologies for assessing market
power. It does acknowledge that in markets for evolving technologies regulators
are “struggling to apply the correct framework,” but it then simply asserts that
these regulators should not abandon processes requiring a market definition.75
It would be premature to say that the Supreme Court’s conclusion in AmEx
requiring a market definition in vertical cases as a matter of law is part of a more
general assault on the use of economics to assess market power. Based on this
single data point, however, the Supreme Court and economic analysis seem to
be going in opposite directions. As economic methodologies for assessing power
are becoming more sophisticated and accurate, the AmEx discussion rejects them
in favor of a method that has never been particularly accurate, especially not in
differentiated markets.
What would be the proper way to assess market power in any area of antitrust
litigation, including vertical practices? The answer is the same criteria that guide
federal courts’ assessments of scientific questions generally. Nothing about
market power in vertical practice cases calls for a different approach. The issue
would have to be placed in dispute, economists or other experts would be
consulted, and their testimony would be evaluated through an examination of
the relevant technical literature. The testimony would be considered by the
judge, performing the usual gatekeeping function of assessing the expert’s
credentials and methodology. Then and only then would the issue go to the fact
finder. In an equitable challenge such as AmEx, the fact finder would also be the
trial judge.76

72

See, e.g., Letter from Ashley Baker, Dir. of Pub. Pol’y, The Comm. for Just., et al., to
Ken Buck, Andy Biggs & Matt Gaetz, Members, U.S. House of Representatives 5-6 (Jan. 14,
2021)
[hereinafter
Letter
from
Ashley
Baker
et
al.],
https://www.allianceonantitrust.org/blog/conservatives-oppose-third-way-recommendations
[https://perma.cc/B85K-F3BN] (representating the views of FreedomWorks, Competitive
Enterprise Institute, Digital Liberty, Conservatives for Property Rights, The Bork Foundation,
National Taxpayers Union, the Committee for Justice, and others).
73
See generally Kirill O. Rossianov, Editing Nature: Joseph Stalin and the “New” Soviet
Biology, 84 ISIS 728 (1993).
74
Letter from Ashley Baker et al., supra note 72, at 5-6.
75
Id. at 6.
76
Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2293 (2018).
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The second question that the Supreme Court resolved as a matter of law was
that two-sided platforms compete only with other two-sided platforms.77 The
question was not briefed, and the Court appeared not to understand what
competition in the antitrust sense means. The relevant question for antitrust
analysis is whether one firm’s output exerts sufficient pressure on another firm’s
output to hold that firm’s prices reasonably close to its costs. That is, competition
is what limits the market power of a rival firm.
To illustrate, Uber is a ride-hailing platform operating on a two-sided
platform. In computing fares, it must weigh a number of considerations. One is
the need for “participation balancing” in a two-sided market.78 That is, Uber
needs to balance out its own drivers and its own passengers, producing fares that
maximize its profits as between them by providing both sufficient drivers and
sufficient riders. At the same time, however, Uber must also set its fares
sufficiently low so as to compete with both Lyft, its two-sided platform rival, as
well as traditional taxicabs. Customers, after all, are free to choose from any one
of the three, as well as other options. So, for example, if Uber lowers its fares, it
will switch more passengers away from both its two-sided and traditional taxicab
rivals, but it will also lose drivers who can earn more elsewhere; these drivers
could go to Lyft, traditional taxicab services, or somewhere else.
Clearly, while platforms such as Uber must engage in participation balancing
as between its two sides, traditional firms do the same thing. For example, a
traditional taxicab company, or any traditional seller for that matter, must
balance wages and other input costs on one side against product prices on the
other. The idea that keeping input costs low in order to charge lower prices is
hardly a unique feature of platforms.
Should traditional taxicabs be placed in the same relevant market with Uber
and Lyft? The Supreme Court, following AmEx, would say no. In fact, the
answer to that question is not a foregone conclusion. It is possible that traditional
taxicab companies have higher costs. As a result, they are not effective
competitors against Uber and Lyft when prices are close to the competitive level.
For example, traditional taxicab drivers must purchase a costly medallion, or
operating license, that Uber’s drivers do not purchase. However, the medallion
is a fixed cost and very likely does not affect drivers’ marginal costs. Another
factor is that Uber and traditional taxicabs use essentially the same operating
technologies, suggesting that they do compete. Nevertheless, there are
differences in how rides are hailed and fares computed. Uber’s rates and access
are set by a platform app; taxicabs’ rates are determined by a commission, and
customers obtain access by more traditional means. It is possible that these
differences produce significant cost differentials one way or the other. As a
result, we may ultimately conclude that Uber and Lyft are not significantly price
constrained by the traditional taxicabs, and we would express that conclusion by
77
Id. at 2287 (“Only other two-sided platforms can compete with a two-sided platform for
transactions.”).
78
Erik Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, 44 J. CORP. L. 713, 722 (2019).
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saying that the taxicabs are not in the same relevant market. These would all be
empirical questions for the fact finder, however, and almost certainly for expert
testimony. Nothing about these issues suggests that the question of whether Uber
and traditional taxicabs are competitors for antitrust purposes should be decided
as a matter of law and without regard to these facts.
The Court’s conclusion that two-sided platforms compete only with other
two-sided platforms considerably exaggerates the market power of two-sided
platforms that sell in the same markets as traditional stores. To illustrate,
Carvana is a two-sided platform that sells used cars. Assuming that it is the only
such platform, a court following AmEx would be forced to conclude that it is a
monopolist. However, if one looks at the full range of consumer used car sales,
Carvana’s market share as of late 2020 was less than 1%.79 That makes
Carvana’s monopoly status ludicrous. In its decision Philadelphia Taxi Ass’n v.
Uber Technologies, Inc.,80 the Third Circuit dismissed a complaint of attempted
monopolization against Uber, finding in part that Uber’s share of ridership “in
the context of all the competitors in the Philadelphia taxicab market” was not
sufficiently high.81 According to AmEx, however, that was the wrong question
to ask. Uber’s market share should have been assessed only as against Lyft, its
platform competitor. In that case, Uber would have been a dominant firm.82
The question of whether two-sided markets and more traditional markets
“compete” for antitrust purposes should be addressed in the same way that courts
consider other economic questions. In AmEx, the Court’s error was dicta. The
antisteering rule at issue applied only as between payments with competing
cards and not to customers who might pay by cash or check. As a result, all of
the relevant competing entities were two-sided platforms, and the Court’s
statement to the effect that a two-sided market competes only with other twosided markets was unnecessary to the decision.
However, not all dicta are alike. When the Supreme Court makes a categorical
statement as a matter of law, the lower courts tend to follow it, whether or not it
is dicta. That has already happened in one lower court case involving a merger.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware held that a merger between
Sabre, a two-sided airline reservation platform, and a firm processing airline
reservations in a more traditional way could not be horizontal because two-sided

79

See Louis Stevens, Carvana: A Compelling Narrative with One Major Issue, SEEKING
ALPHA (Sep. 21, 2020, 4:47 PM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4375563-carvanacompelling-narrative-one-major-issue (noting Carvana’s 2019 sales of 177,000 vehicles out
of 40,000,000 used cars total sold).
80
886 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 2018).
81
Id. at 342 (emphasis omitted).
82
See Liyin Yeo, Uber v. Lyft: Who’s Tops in the Battle of U.S. Rideshare Companies,
SECOND MEASURE (Jan. 20, 2021), https://secondmeasure.com/datapoints/rideshare-industryoverview/ [https://perma.cc/N4EJ-49TM] (noting that, as of December 2020, Uber had about
two-thirds of the Philadelphia rideshare business as between Uber and Lyft).
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platforms and more traditional platforms do not compete with each other as a
matter of law.83
So why did the AmEx decision turn these important factual issues into
questions of law? As noted earlier, they cannot legitimately be regarded as
exercises in statutory interpretation. A cynical answer might be that the Court
was result oriented—that the model that the scientific community was
increasingly applying did not produce outcomes that the Court’s majority
favored. In particular, there may have been a fear that scientific conclusions tend
to favor more interventionist positions. The proposition that conservatives are
more suspicious of science has some empirical support.84
That could explain the conclusion requiring a relevant market definition in a
vertical case, but it does not explain the conclusion that two-sided platforms
compete only with each other. As noted above, the Court’s scientifically
incorrect conclusion about the range of competitors faced by a two-sided
platform is at least as likely to increase as to decrease one’s estimates of a firm’s
market power, and thus the case for antitrust intervention.
Another explanation, which fares no better, is that the Court’s majority
wanted to take some economic questions out of the fact-finding process
altogether by treating them as questions of law. That would transfer more
rulemaking power away from experts and toward judges. But that still does not
answer why, nor why these particular questions. Both are technical, heavily
factual, and fall well within the range of economic inquiry in antitrust cases.
I.

APPLE V. PEPPER AND PASSED-ON HARM

In Apple Inc. v. Pepper,85 both the majority opinion and the dissent were
detached from the economic issue that has dominated indirect purchaser antitrust
jurisprudence in the United States for forty years—namely, how should the law
reflect that injuries from a cartel or monopoly overcharge are passed down
through the distribution chain from one purchaser to the next, although in
varying degrees. The questions that the Supreme Court confronted in Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois86 more than forty years earlier had to do with difficulties in

83
United States v. Sabre Corp., 452 F. Supp. 3d 97, 148-49 (D. Del. 2020), vacated on
other grounds, No. 20-01767, 2020 WL 4915824 (3d Cir. July 20, 2020). The order was
vacated after the parties voluntarily abandoned the transaction.
84
E.g., Bruce W. Hardy, Meghnaa Tallapragada, John C. Besley & Shupei Yuan, The
Effects of the “War on Science” Frame on Scientists’ Credibility, 41 SCI. COMMC’N 90 (2019).
The observation is not recent. See generally CHRIS MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON
SCIENCE (2005).
85
139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).
86
431 U.S. 720 (1977). The Court held that its decision followed logically from Hanover
Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968), in which the Court
held that a defendant in an antitrust case could not reduce its liability by showing that the
plaintiffs had not absorbed the entire overcharge but rather passed it down to its own
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estimating passed-on damages and the impact of alternative rules on deterrence
of antitrust violations.87
Since that time, we have made important advances in the measurement of
indirect purchaser damages, many of which do not require the stage-by-stage
computation of pass on at all.88 Several American states,89 as well as the EU and
its member states, have embraced methodologies for addressing the problem.
Right now, the state of EU policy on the question is far more advanced than that
of the United States.90 The EU has approached the problem as an empirical one
of efficient and reasonably accurate damages measurement. It has largely been
able to avoid the ideological baggage that has weighed down indirect purchaser
jurisprudence in the United States.
By contrast, the Supreme Court’s suggestion in Illinois Brick that limiting
damages to direct purchasers would improve deterrence has never been validated
and must be counted as dubious. It seems more doubtful today than it was when
the Supreme Court stated it in 1977.91 At least the economic case for the indirect
purchaser rule is significantly weaker today than it was at that time. One feature
of the Supreme Court’s indirect purchaser rule is that it turns into a question of
law what is rightfully a question of factual economic analysis. A troublesome
thing about Apple v. Pepper is not that the Court was incorrect in its
interpretation of economic developments subsequent to Illinois Brick but that it
did not engage them at all. For all intents and purposes, Apple v. Pepper broke

purchasers. On the economics and law of Illinois Brick, see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra
note 67, ¶ 346.
87
Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 742 (finding it unrealistic to think that evidence introduced
by expert witnesses will resolve pass-on issue).
88
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Apple v. Pepper: Rationalizing Antitrust’s Indirect Purchaser
Rule, 120 COLUM. L. REV. F. 14, 20 (2020) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Indirect Purchaser Rule]
(noting that, in most cases, “experts can assess damages without computing pass-on”).
89
On state antitrust indirect purchaser rules, see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 67,
¶ 2412d.
90
See Guidelines for National Courts on How to Estimate the Share of Overcharge Which
Was Passed On to the Indirect Purchaser, 2019 O.J. (C 267) 7 [hereinafter EU Guidelines].
91
See Barak D. Richman & Christopher R. Murray, Rebuilding Illinois Brick: A
Functionalist Approach to the Indirect Purchaser Rule, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 69, 92-94 (2007)
(finding that indirect purchaser rule strongly leads to underdeterrence); see also Andrew S.
Gehring, The Power of the Purchaser: The Effect of Indirect Purchaser Damages Suits on
Deterring Antitrust Violations, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 208, 243-44 (2010) (inconclusive).
By contrast, the government argued in an amicus brief in Apple v. Pepper that permitting
indirect purchaser suits leads to duplicative recoveries. Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9, Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019) (No. 17-204)
(“[E]ven if some or all of that overcharge had been passed on to consumers, allowing
consumers to sue as well would create an evident prospect of duplicative recovery.”); see also
ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 271-72 (2007)
(warning of duplicative recoveries if indirect purchaser actions were permitted).
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the link between the indirect purchaser rule and the economics of passed-on
damages.
A.

Why an Overcharge?

One technical problem with the law of purchaser damages actions under
Illinois Brick is the largely unquestioned assumption that a court should measure
damages at each stage by an overcharge and not by the lost profits that result
from reduced sales. The very notion of “passing on” suggests that the measure
must be based on the overcharge. The statute does not compel this result. Section
4 of the Clayton Act merely authorizes recovery for an injury sustained by the
violation and gives a damages action to “any person.”92 Further, it states no
methodology for measurement. For intermediaries in the distribution chain—
that is, for purchasers other than the final consumer—lost output is almost
always a more accurate measure of injury and generally does not require
apportioning among the parties.93
When a cartel or monopolist increases a product’s price, it also reduces
output.94 Just as the price increase, that output reduction is passed on through
the distribution chain. All downstream firms are affected by both the loss in
volume and perhaps by a reduced margin, or markup, on their sales of the
cartelized good. In most situations, the output reduction is a surer thing than the
margin reduction. Further, in most cases, measuring the passed-on output
reduction is easier than measuring the passed-on overcharge because it remains
more uniform as it passes through the distribution chain.
Suppose a distribution chain contains four stages: a manufacturer,
distributors, dealers, and consumers. If a manufacturing cartel covering the
entire market increases their price, the distributors and dealers will each pass on
something between 0% and more than 100% of that overcharge depending on
markup policies and the amount of competition they face. The phrase “more than
100%” is apt. If a firm uses a standard markup formula, it may actually increase
its margin as a result of the cartel. For example, suppose a grocer routinely adds
30% to the wholesale price of canned vegetables. That is a realistic assumption.
Indeed, Apple in the Apple v. Pepper case routinely added 30% to the price of
the apps that it sells.95 If the wholesale price is competitive at $2.00, the grocer
will add 60 cents. However, if the wholesale price is secretly cartelized to $2.50,
it will add 75 cents. Far from “absorbing” part of the overcharge, this retailer
actually obtains higher margins under the cartel and thus passes on more than

92

15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
Hovenkamp, Indirect Purchaser Rule, supra note 88, at 24 (discussing differences
between pass-on and lost output measurements).
94
See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 3, § 1.2a.
95
See Louise Matsakis, The Supreme Court Will Decide if Apple’s App Store Is a
Monopoly, 2018-2019 SUP. CT. PREVIEW 298, 298 (noting Apple App Store’s 30%
commission).
93
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100% of the overcharge. How much it actually passes on is an empirical question
readily subject to expert testimony, and it will vary from one situation to another.
By contrast, if this same cartel reduces output from a competitive level of 100
units to 80 units, the aggregate distributors’ sales will go from 100 units to 80
units, as will the retailers’ sales, all the way down to the final consumer. To be
sure, the availability of substitutes and variable proportions can complicate this
result. For example, the grocer might respond to reduced sales volume of canned
beans by allocating more shelf space to peas or carrots. An overcharge measure
will not reflect these substitutions because it looks only to the bean purchases.
Likewise, if a cartel of bicycle manufacturers reduces the number of bicycles by
20% from the previous competitive level, their aggregate distributors would
resell 20% fewer bicycles, as would the retailers below them. However, these
firms might make up some of their losses by selling more scooters or roller
skates.96 A lost profits measure will consider how the dealer’s behavior overall
changed its profits, accounting for both lost margin and lost sales.
In principle, there is no reason to think that output losses downstream are
more difficult to measure than margin losses. Further, in a wide variety of
situations, intermediaries are able to pass on close to 100% of the price increase,
but they will nearly always suffer as a result of the output reduction. For nearly
all intermediaries, injury is best measured not by an overcharge but rather by
lost profits—that is, the money that they would have made on the unmade sales.
This measure of harm is common in all antitrust cases alleging exclusionary
practices.97 It is also common in a wide range of non-antitrust statutory and
common-law claims that involve injured business plaintiffs.98
Lost profits are usually measured by the reduction in sales multiplied by the
net margin on the unmade sales. That measure accounts for both changes in the
markup and the quantity. This number would then have to be adjusted for
changes in expenses, plus perhaps an offset for product substitution.99 In
practice, experts often rely on “before-and-after” or “yardstick” models, which
compare the situation in the violation market to some other market setting.100

96

Other intermediaries might substitute in more complex ways. For example, in response
to a steel cartel, automakers might use fewer steel parts and more plastic or aluminum parts.
However, overcharge damages measurement will be affected in the same way.
97
See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 67, ¶ 397.
98
E.g., Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933-35 (2016) (lost profits
for patent infringement); Broan Mfg. Co. v. Associated Distribs., Inc., 923 F.2d 1232, 123536 (6th Cir. 1991) (trademark infringement); Ashland Mgmt. Inc. v. Janien, 624 N.E.2d 1007,
1008-09 (N.Y. 1993) (breach of contract); Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646 S.W.2d 927, 928-29
(Tex. 1983) (fraud).
99
See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 67, ¶ 397 (discussing calculation of damages in
form of “but for” profits).
100
See discussion infra Section I.C.
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The Restatement (Second) of Torts calls for similar measures for business
injuries.101
B.

Unwarranted Exceptionalism in Antitrust Damages

When it comes to losses by business plaintiffs, Illinois Brick is a piece of
obsolete legal exceptionalism that came out of a period when many judges and
scholars believed that antitrust was overdeterrent and that courts needed to apply
the brakes to broad damages claims. That is hardly the case today. Indeed, in the
particular case of price-fixing, the law is significantly underdeterrent.102 Thanks
to four decades of litigating under state antitrust law and a large economic
literature, it seems clear that it is time for the law of damages to treat plaintiffs
in antitrust cases the same way it treats injured parties in the more general run
of business cases. While measuring lost profits in all these cases presents
complexities, it is no greater in antitrust cases than for other types of injuries.
Antitrust policy needs to be less categorical and more empirical about
assessing passed-on injury from monopolistic or cartel conduct. As the EU
Guidelines on indirect purchaser damages recognize, the optimal methodology
will vary from case to case, depending on the types of evidence that are available
and given a wide variety of market facts.103 In most cases, except those involving
final consumers, lost-profits estimates will be superior to overcharge estimates
because they reflect the impact of the violation on both margins and volumes.
By contrast, overcharge estimates reflect only the impact on margins.
Perversely and incorrectly, reduced volume tends to reduce an intermediary’s
damages if it is measured only by the overcharge. It can recover the overcharge
only on the purchases actually made, which are fewer at the cartel or monopoly
price. For example, suppose that two different cartels produce price overcharges
of $1.00 per unit in a market that produced 100 units at the competitive price.
One cartel yields an output reduction of 30 units while the other yields an output
reduction of 40 units. The second cartel causes greater harm to the economy and
to the affected dealer, but that dealer will collect fewer damages because these
will be limited to the overcharge on 60 (100-40) units rather than 70 (100-30)
units.
101

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549 (AM. L. INST. 1977) (describing lost profit
damages for fraudulent misrepresentation); id. § 774A (tortious interference with contract);
id. § 821C (public nuisance); id. § 937 (conversion).
102
See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., POLICY ROUNDTABLES: CARTEL SANCTIONS
AGAINST INDIVIDUALS 7-8 (2003), https://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels /34306028.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N4CY-GP8M] (discussing possibility of sanctions against individuals
where punishment imposed by law does not sufficiently deter); Peter G. Bryant & E.
Woodrow Eckard, Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught, 73 REV. ECON. & STAT.
531, 535 (1991) (finding between .13 and .17 probability of being caught in price-fixing
schemes); John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime
Pays, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 427, 435-42 (2012) (discussing effectiveness of corporate
sanctions as compared to individual sanctions).
103
EU Guidelines, supra note 90.
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By contrast, lost profit damages capture what is almost universally regarded
as an element of injury in nearly all other business injury cases—namely, that
the intermediary suffers reduced volume and thus earns profits on a smaller
number of sales. The dealer in the above example would collect lost profit
damages that reflect the output reduction multiplied by the lost margin on each
lost sale. This reflects the true injury caused by the cartel.
The one exception to the preference for damages based on lost profits is the
final consumer who does not resell the product at all. For her, the overcharge is
the best measure. There are other, more limited exceptions where the overcharge
is the appropriate measure. One is where the price-fixed good is a pure fixed cost
to the purchasing business. In general, fixed costs cannot be passed on because
they do not show up in marginal costs.104 For example, a farmer who pays a
monopoly price for farmland as a result of a cartel will not be able to add
anything to the price of the corn that she grows on it.
For most antitrust exclusionary practices and the very large variety of
damages cases involving torts, IP infringement, or other harmful activity, we
assess damages by permitting experts to provide models addressed to lost profits
and evidence supporting them. Then judges evaluate the models for technical
sufficiency and fit under the Daubert standards applied under the Federal Rules
of Evidence.105 After that, the evidence can go to the fact finder. The same thing
applies to indirect purchaser claims under state antitrust law.106
C.

Innovations in the Computation of Passed-On Damages

As litigation subsequent to Illinois Brick has established in state antitrust
cases, even when courts use an overcharge measure, the overcharge need not be
104
See Robert G. Harris & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Passing On the Monopoly Overcharge:
A Comprehensive Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 269, 280-83 (1979) (comparing fixedand variable-cost changes under monopolies).
105
E.g., ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 291-92 (3d Cir. 2012) (accepting
expert’s testimony on liability, but applying Daubert to reject damages testimony in antitrust
case); LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Comput., Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 78 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding
that Daubert required that patentee’s damages be limited to patented feature rather than
market value of entire device); Sys. Dev. Integration, LLC v. Comput. Scis. Corp., 886 F.
Supp. 2d 873, 884-86 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (applying Daubert to assess reliability of damages
expert in breach of contract and fiduciary duty case); Lightlab Imaging, Inc. v. Axsun Techs.,
Inc., 13 N.E.3d 604, 613-14 (Mass. 2014) (rejecting expert’s lost profits damages report in
contract dispute under Daubert as too speculative). On these standards, see Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
106
E.g., Howe v. Microsoft Corp., 656 N.W.2d 285, 296-97 (N.D. 2003) (noting relevance
of Daubert evidentiary rules to indirect purchaser antitrust claim); In re S.D. Microsoft
Antitrust Litig., 707 N.W.2d 85, 112-14 (S.D. 2005) (same); see also In re Processed Egg
Prods. Antitrust Litig., 312 F.R.D. 124, 153-56 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (rejecting expert’s indirect
purchaser damages model under Daubert); In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 284 F.R.D. 207,
234-35 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (approving expert’s methodology for assessing indirect purchaser
damages under Daubert challenge).
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computed at each stage of pass on.107 Illinois Brick itself assumed that it did, and
the Court did not even discuss alternative methodologies. Two years later,
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner institutionalized that view in an
article defending the decision.108
The most common models for estimating damages under both overcharge and
lost profit theories are “before and after” and “yardstick.”109 In a “before-andafter” lost profits model, the expert typically uses regression analysis to examine
profits prior to a violation, after its end, or both, discounting for other factors
and estimating what the profits would have been during the violation period.110
In a “yardstick” model, the expert compares profits in the violation market with
profits of a similarly situated firm in a comparable market.111 Neither method is
necessary, however, if there are adequate data. For example, if the size of the
output reduction and margins are known, estimation of lost profits is relatively
straightforward.112
Overcharge methodologies are similar except that the expert estimates the
overcharge rather than lost profits. Once again, neither the before-and-after nor
the yardstick methodologies for computing damages require that a court
compute passed-on damages at each stage.113 Rather, one can estimate damages
directly by comparing prices at the violation level and the plaintiffs’ level in the
two markets. For example, one might compare with the cartel market a different
market assumed to be competitive and then observe the differences in dealer
prices in those two markets. We would then have an estimate of the amount of
overcharge passed on to consumers without the need to estimate how much of
the overcharge was absorbed by distributors or other intermediaries.114 Experts
sometimes term this the “bottom across” model, rather than the “top down”
model, which attempts to compute pass on at each stage.115

107
See Hovenkamp, supra note 88, at 15 (discussing to whom overcharge should be
allocated under Illinois Brick).
108
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing
to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U.
CHI. L. REV. 602, 634 (1979) (“[T]he rule of Illinois Brick . . . is probably the soundest rule
from the standpoint of maximizing the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement.”).
109
See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 67, ¶ 395b (discussing before-and-after and
yardstick measures in overcharge antitrust cases cases); id. ¶ 397e-f (same, in lost profit).
110
See id. ¶ 397e.
111
Id. ¶ 397f (discussing computation used in “yardstick” model).
112
For an example, see Formax, Inc. v. Alkar-Rapidpak-MP Equip., Inc., No. 11-cv00298, 2014 WL 3057116, at *3 (E.D. Wis. July 7, 2014) (estimating lost-profit damages
based on lost sales plus effect on margins); see also 1 ROBERT L. DUNN, RECOVERY OF
DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS (6th ed. 2005); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Measuring
Sellers’ Damages: The Lost-Profits Puzzle, 31 STAN. L. REV. 323, 333-34 (1979).
113
For an explanation, see Hovenkamp, Indirect Purchaser Rule, supra note 88, at 19-21.
114
Id.
115
E.g., In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 326, 344 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
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In Apple v. Pepper, neither the majority nor the dissent engaged any of these
issues. Indeed, both opinions appear to have abandoned the idea that Illinois
Brick had anything to do with passed-on damages. For the majority, the only
thing that mattered was that the plaintiffs purchased directly from the alleged
violator. If one were to select a single buyer for damages, however, it would be
more sensible to select the consumers—the last purchasers in line—because, in
most cases, they absorb the brunt of an overcharge and are the only purchasers
who are not in a position to pass anything on. Only for them is the overcharge a
presumptively correct measure of damages. The Apple majority was correct to
sustain the action in that case, but that was a result of the pure happenstance that
the alleged violator sold directly to the plaintiffs.
By contrast, the dissent resurrected a doctrine of proximate cause that had
died with the marginalist revolution in economics early in the twentieth
century.116 Finally, neither the majority nor the dissenters ever mentioned
deterrence, which is rightfully central to any economics-based theory of antitrust
enforcement. In sum, the Apple v. Pepper indirect purchaser rule both ignored
the deterrence question and seemed indifferent to who is actually injured by a
cartel or monopoly overcharge.
II.

AMEX AND ANTITRUST ECONOMICS

The Supreme Court’s AmEx decision embraced a series of economically
incoherent principles in the guise of applying antitrust economics. The majority
(1) neglected the kind of transactional analysis that has become a hallmark of
the economic approach to law; (2) put production complements into the same
“relevant market”; (3) held that a relevant market must be defined in a vertical
restraints case, even if the economic evidence supported a finding of market
power based on more direct and generally more accurate measures;
(4) completely misunderstood the economics of free riding, which in the context
of vertical restraints is a Chicago school invention (in this case, the defendant’s
policies clearly made free riding impossible); and (5) lost sight of the fact that
coherent economic analysis of any antitrust issue requires assessment of
marginal rather than total effects.
A.

Balancing Harms and Benefits on Two-Sided Markets

The Supreme Court majority’s analysis of two-sided platforms got off on the
wrong track when it assumed that harms on one side, in the form of increased
merchant prices, would invariably be offset by benefits on the other, cardholder
side.117 For some platform-related queries, this is true. For example, measuring
a platform’s costs or revenues requires looking at both sides. Over-the-air
television or computer search engines that are free to users are not engaged in
predatory pricing. They obtain their revenues from advertisers, which are the

116
117

See generally HOVENKAMP, OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 3, at 106-22.
See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2287-88 (2018).
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other side of the platform. Assessing a predation claim alleging below-cost
pricing requires looking at both sides.
But this harm/benefit balance does not occur in every situation. Had the Court
performed the kind of transactional analysis that Ronald Coase urged and that
has become a hallmark of law and economics, it would have seen that the
assumption of harms to merchants and offsetting benefits to cardholders did not
apply in this case.118 If the Court had examined each relevant transaction in
AmEx, it would have seen that the antisteering rules harmed both sides.119
To illustrate, suppose that a $1,000 purchase incurred a 3% ($30) merchant
fee on the AmEx card but a 2% ($20) fee on a competing card such as Visa. This
difference creates $10 worth of bargaining room in which both parties can make
a profit. That is, the merchant’s willingness to pay might be greater than the
customer’s willingness to accept.120 For example, the merchant might offer the
customer a $5 discount for using the cheaper card. If the incremental perks from
using an AmEx card rather than a different card were worth less than $5 to the
customer, it would accept that deal and both parties would be better off. The
merchant would pay a lower transaction fee and a customer who accepted the
offer would be getting a discount that was worth more to her than any extra
benefit the AmEx card might offer. By contrast, if she valued the AmEx perks
by more than $5, she would not accept the offer.121
However, the antisteering rule prevented this transaction from occurring. Far
from harming one side while benefitting the other, the antisteering rule harmed
both the merchant and the cardholder who was willing to make the deal. It also
harmed Visa, the card issuer who was unable to make the transaction even
though its price was lower and it would have been the customer’s first choice in
an unrestrained market. It did benefit AmEx—but these were not network
benefits that needed to be assessed against losses elsewhere on the same
platform. They were simply the benefits that accrued from being able to charge
a price that was higher than the added value of any provided customer services
without losing a sale.122 This number had nothing to do with the existence of a
two-sided platform.
B.

Market Definition and Extramarket Effects

The AmEx Court concluded that analyzing the competitive effects of the
defendant’s antisteering rule required identification of a “single market” when
118
Coase, supra note 42, at 392-94 (determining boundaries of firm by looking at each
individual transaction that a firm makes).
119
See Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, supra note 78, at 740-43.
120
E.g., Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1982).
121
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Platforms and the Rule of Reason: The American Express
Case, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 35, 43-44.
122
That is, looking at the previous example, the fact that the customer would prefer the
offer of a $5 discount meant that she valued use of the AmEx card by less than $5, while
AmEx’s excess merchant fee over the Visa card was $10.
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such a definition reflected “commercial realities.”123 That seems plausible
enough. However, it then concluded that both sides of a platform—merchants
and cardholders—needed to be placed into the same relevant market.124 That
conclusion violated one of the most cardinal principles of economics since the
time of Alfred Marshall or even Augustin Cournot—namely, that markets
consist of close substitutes that can steal sales from one another, such that
competition forces them to move toward the same price.125 To be sure, it is a
“commercial reality” that a market contains both buyers and sellers, but every
market does that.
The Court’s discussion indicates that it was confusing the question of market
definition with that of anticompetitive effects. Clearly, one cannot identify harm
from higher merchant fees without considering what is happening on the other
side to cardholders. Beginning with the proposition that market definition
determines the “area of effective competition,” it concluded that “courts must
include both sides of the platform—merchants and cardholders—when defining
the credit-card market.”126 A few sentences later the majority suggested that twosided platforms are best understood as supplying a single product,
“transactions.”127 It then added that in order to have a market, one would require
both merchants and cardholders.128 But every market contains buyers, sellers,
and transactions. None of these distinguished a two-sided market from a fish
market in the Middle Ages.
Transactions do form one essential service when we evaluate markets. They
provide the data that we use for measurement. That is, it is not the merchants
themselves who define the market but rather their trading. Trading is measured
typically by either the number of units sold or their value, both of which are
measures of transactions. The Court confused the question of market definition
with the question of who is affected by trading in a particular market. In this
case, we want to know whether offsetting benefits that accrued to cardholders
Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285 (2018) (quoting United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 572 (1966)).
124
Id. at 2287.
125
E.g., MARSHALL, supra note 40, at 384 (“[T]he more nearly perfect a market is, the
stronger is the tendency for the same price to be paid for the same thing at the same time in
all parts of the market.”); id. (defining the market as “the whole of any region in which buyers
and sellers are in such free intercourse with one another that the prices of the same goods tend
to equality easily and quickly”). Marshall was translating AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES
INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH (1838).
126
Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2285-86 (quoting 2 JULIAN O. VON KALINOWKI, PETER
SULLIVAN & MAUREEN MCGUIRL, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 24.01[4][a]
(2d ed. 2020)).
127
Id.
128
Id. at 2287. A credit-card company that processed transactions for merchants but that
had no cardholders willing to use its card could not compete with AmEx. See id. Only a
company that had both cardholders and merchants willing to use its network could sell
transactions and compete in the credit-card market.
123
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should be included in our calculation of competitive effects. But that is not a
question of market definition. It is one of how harm should be assessed.
In this case, the higher merchant fees showed harm to merchants. Otherwise,
they would have no motive to steer. At that point, the issue was whether this
harm was justified by greater consumer benefits—not a market definition
question at all. In this case, the answer was that there were no greater consumer
benefits; affected consumers were also harmed.129 But that is a different issue.
A “market” defines the group of firms that can profit from collusion;130 the
scope of sales that give meaning to the term “monopolist”;131 the range of goods
and services that people regard as good substitutes for one another;132 and the
range of producers that a firm regards as its competitors for the purposes of
deciding whether to enter,133 how much to produce, or what price to charge.134
For example, the Merger Guidelines used by the antitrust agencies define
markets by identifying the range of goods that are close substitutes.135
Conceptually, the idea of a relevant market comes from partial equilibrium
analysis in microeconomics, a tool that dates to the time of Alfred Marshall to
evaluate market changes that affect the producers of similar goods in a common
and observable way.136 Defining a market in this fashion involves a working
assumption that output and pricing of the goods inside the market have no effect
on goods outside the market.
Empirically, of course, this is not true. Even well-defined markets have
porous boundaries. The goods inside are affected by imperfect substitutes

See discussion supra text accompanying notes 117-122.
See, e.g., Malcolm B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, A Practical Guide to the Hypothetical
Monopolist Test for Market Definition, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1031, 1035 (2008).
131
Id. (using “small, but significant, nontransitory increase in price” to determine
monopolist in market); see also, e.g., U.S. DOJ & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
§ 4.1.1 (2010) (using “hypothetical monopolist” test for market definition).
132
Coate & Fischer, supra note 130, at 1036.
133
Id. at 1037.
134
Justice Breyer’s dissent found the AmEx majority’s new approach to market definition
completely unjustified.
Missing from the majority’s analysis is any explanation as to why, given the purposes
that market definition serves in antitrust law, the fact that a credit-card firm can be said
to operate a “two-sided transaction platform” means that its merchant-related and
shopper-related services should be combined into a single market.
Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2297-98 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
135
U.S. DOJ & FTC, supra note 131, § 4 (“Market definition focuses solely on demand
substitution factors, i.e., on customers’ ability and willingness to substitute away from one
product to another in response to a price increase or a corresponding non-price change such
as a reduction in product quality or service.”).
136
On the development in Alfred Marshall, see HOVENKAMP, OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW,
supra note 3, at 31-33.
129
130
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outside, as well as by complements.137 Nevertheless, by grouping close
substitutes in this way and constructing a wall between these and more distant
products, courts have been able to draw important conclusions about the
existence of market power. As a result, this method of assessing power is well
established in antitrust analysis, although tools have now been developed that
are more accurate and that make market definition approaches unnecessary in
many circumstances.138 Unfortunately, the AmEx Court also ruled out the use of
these tools in cases involving vertical restraints.
The Supreme Court was legitimately concerned with one relatively common
problem that is hardly unique to two-sided markets: when transactions or other
events outside the defined market have a measurable impact on harms or
benefits, they must be accounted for.139 Over the years, antitrust litigation has
confronted several approaches to the question of so-called “extramarket” effects.
One of the most theoretical and least appealing is the theory of “second best,”
which relies on general equilibrium analysis to consider the impact that a
practice might have on entities or events outside of the relevant market.140 For
example, under second-best theory, the data might show a welfare improvement
in a defined market, but there might be significant out-of-market effects that
serve to make things worse off as a whole.141 The consensus today is that the

137
Marshall himself understood this. See ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS,
at xiv (8th ed. 1920), for a defense of the idea that economic analysis should examine a part
of the market consisting of a single “commodity” over a restricted time period, assuming that
changes within the observed market had no effect on things outside.
The forces to be dealt with are however so numerous, that it is best to take a few at a
time; and to work out a number of partial solutions as auxiliaries to our main study. Thus
we begin by isolating the primary relations of supply, demand and price in regard to a
particular commodity. We reduce to inaction all other forces by the phrase “other things
being equal”: we do not suppose that they are inert, but for the time we ignore their
activity. This scientific device is a great deal older than science: it is the method by
which, consciously or unconsciously, sensible men have dealt from time immemorial
with every difficult problem of ordinary life.
Id. On the antitrust relevant market as a tool of partial equilibrium analysis, see Gregory J.
Werden, The Relevant Market: Possible and Productive, ANTITRUST L.J. ONLINE, Apr. 2014,
at 1. On the fundamentals, see SUSHENG WANG, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 95-126 (4th ed.
2018).
138
See discussion infra text accompanying notes 174-183.
139
Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2286 (noting that decisions of cardholders to have AmEx
card and decisions of merchants to accept AmEx cards are both necessary because market is
two-sided).
140
See, e.g., Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total
Welfare, and the Challenge of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. REV. 849, 850
(2000) (recognizing that multiple market failures may increase overall welfare).
141
Id. (noting that market failures impact other markets as well).
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general theory of second best is too complex to have much application to
antitrust analysis, despite some heroic attempts to make it so.142
Another prominent use of partial equilibrium analysis is Oliver Williamson’s
well-known welfare tradeoff model, which assumed a single market in which
participants would feel the welfare effects of reduced competition and increased
efficiency.143 In using it, Williamson acknowledged the problem of second best:
“Our partial equilibrium analysis suffers from a defect common to all partial
equilibrium constructions. By isolating one sector from the rest of the economy
it fails to examine interactions between sectors.”144
Merger analysis can also require judicial examination of out-of-market
effects. For example, a merger of multimarket firms might reduce competition
in one market but increase it in another.145 One legal limitation is that Section 7
of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers that injure competition “in any line of
commerce” and in any “section of the country.”146 Those statements do not
appear to permit trading harms in one market against gains in a different
market.147 If a merger injures competition “in any line of commerce,” then under
the statute it literally does not matter if it also produces benefits somewhere else.
The 2010 Merger Guidelines take this position by requiring a showing that a
merger “is not likely to be anticompetitive in any relevant market.”148
Yet another example of extramarket effects is the theory of monopoly
“leveraging,” or the idea that a firm can use its power in one market to obtain an

142
For one attempt, see Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best Theory and the Standard
Analysis of Monopoly Rent Seeking: A Generalizable Critique, a “Sociological” Account,
and Some Illustrative Stories, 78 IOWA L. REV. 327 (1993).
143
Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58
AM. ECON. REV. 18, 20 (1968) [hereinafter Williamson, Economies] (highlighting the
importance of analyzing trade-offs in antitrust cases). Williamson expanded on the use of
partial equilibrium analysis in antitrust and its assumptions in Oliver E. Williamson,
Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699 (1977).
144
Williamson, Economies, supra note 143, at 23.
145
E.g., United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963) (finding that merger
presumably harmed competition in market dominated by small banks and smaller loans but
would have improved competition in market for larger loans); see also United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (finding that anticompetitive
consequences in one region could not be offset against lower prices and reduced freight
charges in another region); Daniel A. Crane, Balancing Effects Across Markets, 80 ANTITRUST
L.J. 397, 397 (2015) (discussing rule that prohibits judicial examination of out-of-market
effects of mergers).
146
15 U.S.C. § 18 (condemning mergers “where in any line of commerce or in any activity
affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly”).
147
See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 67, ¶ 972 (arguing that increased efficiencies
in a different market do not help consumers who are harmed by merger in relevant market).
148
U.S. DOJ & FTC, supra note 131, § 10, at 30.
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advantage in a second market.149 The theory had a life of several decades,
although it was not frequently accepted by courts. The Supreme Court’s decision
in Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan150 very likely put an end to it as a theory
of action by requiring that there be a dangerous probability of success of
monopoly in the second market. That effectively turned leveraging into part of
the law of attempt to monopolize.151 However, Spectrum Sports did not dispose
of the basic economic theory that a firm could use its power in one market to
obtain advantages or even to monopolize a second market.152 For example, while
subsequent decisions such as Microsoft never spoke of leveraging, the theory of
action was that a firm used is structural advantage in one market (the Windows
operating system) in order to injure competition in a different but
complementary market (browsers).153
A related and quite frequent use of effects outside of a primary market is the
law of tying arrangements. The tying and tied products in these cases are usually
complements, such as salt-injecting machines and salt, printers and ink
cartridges, cameras and film, or computer operating systems and browsers or
other applications.154 The theory is typically that a firm has significant market
power in a primary market and then uses tying to distort competition in the
second, or complementary, market. In such cases, we do not define a single
market for the tying and tied products; that would be nonsensical. Rather, courts
are asked to determine whether the defendant’s power in one market is sufficient
to cause anticompetitive distortions in the second market, with monopoly being
the most extreme one, and then, if it has such power, whether the firm has

149
See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948) (“[T]he use of monopoly
power, however lawfully acquired, to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage,
or to destroy a competitor, is unlawful.”); Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC,
257 F.3d 256, 272-73 (2d Cir. 2001) (rejecting theory on the facts of this case); Intergraph
Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (largely rejecting the theory);
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 1979) (accepting the
theory but finding it inapplicable).
150
506 U.S. 447 (1993).
151
Id. at 459 (holding that a single firm’s conduct is illegal only when it threatens to
monopolize market); see also Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 203
(3d Cir. 1992) (recognizing that leveraging claim could only survive if defendants had
“monopoly, or a dangerous probability of a monopoly” in relevant market).
152
See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 67, ¶ 652 (noting that monopolists can cause
negative consequences in a second market).
153
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Microsoft
designed Windows 98 ‘so that using Navigator on Windows 98 would have unpleasant
consequences for users’ . . . .”). The district court did speak of leveraging power from the
operating system market to the browser market. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp.
2d 30, 46 (D.D.C. 2000) (holding that Microsoft unlawfully leveraged monopoly power), aff’d
in part and rev’d in part, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
154
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 67, ¶ 1704 (explaining effects of tying
complements on secondary markets).
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actually done so.155 For example, a firm with a dominant share in a computer
operating system market might be able to tie an Internet browser and thereby
foreclose, or exclude, rivals in the browser market.156
Analytically related to tying are vertical mergers, which unite firms that stand
in a supplier/buyer relationship, such as a manufacturer and one of its parts
suppliers157 or an Internet or cable services provider and a digital programmer.158
In general, condemnation requires a showing that the merger tends to exclude
rivals in the secondary market or else increase their costs. As with tying, we do
not define a single market for both the upstream and downstream good, and it
would not be enlightening to do so. Neither do the government’s Vertical Merger
Guidelines, which were promulgated subsequent to the AmEx decision.159
In sum, antitrust has been dealing with effects that occur outside the
boundaries of a defined relevant market for a long time. It is hardly news that
offsetting pressures from a complementary good might affect the strength of an
inference of market power. For example, the high price of fuel might limit the
market power of automobile makers, or high compensation for Uber drivers
might limit ridership.
But defining a relevant market for “automobiles/gasoline” or for
“drivers/passengers” will not contribute one whit to our understanding of the
situation but will only serve to throw us off track. Defining the market the way
the Court did in AmEx simply made the market power analysis incoherent.160 It
promises to expose the judicial system to thousands of dollars in wasted
resources dealing with questions such as whether Uber drivers and Uber
passengers, physicians and patients, or search engine users and advertisers are
in the same relevant market. Further, it does this in perverse ways that contribute
nothing of value and undermine rather than strengthen the analysis of power.
For example, if we began with a group of Uber drivers in St. Paul, the knowledge
that there are 1,000 additional drivers in nearby Minneapolis would serve to
weaken the inference of their power. By contrast, the knowledge that there were
1,000 additional passengers in Minneapolis would serve to strengthen it. Putting
them all in the same market would require us to treat these two groups in the
155
See id. ¶¶ 1709, 1729 (identifying standards for unreasonable restraints on trade
through tying).
156
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 65-67 (noting that Microsoft’s tie of its Windows operating
system and Internet Explorer browser virtually ousted rival browser Netscape from the
market).
157
E.g., Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 361 (2d Cir. 1979) (approving of vertical
merger between wheel supplier and truck trailer manufacturer).
158
E.g., United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1031-32 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (approving
of vertical merger due to changes in digital entertainment market).
159
U.S. DOJ & FTC, VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 3 (2020), https://www.ftc.gov
/system/files/documents/reports/us-department-justice-federal-trade-commission-verticalmerger-guidelines/vertical_merger_guidelines_6-30-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/FKG7-SAE2].
160
See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2286 (2018) (defining the market for
transactions involving both sides of the two-sided platform).
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same way, even though their effects on power are precisely the opposite. This is
worse than useless.
But the main point is that if one looks at the impact of the antisteering rule,
there were no losses on the merchant side to be traded against gains on the
cardholder side. There were only losses on both sides.161
C.

Assessing Power on Two-Sided Platforms

How should power be assessed for antitrust purposes in markets containing
two-sided platforms, as was the case in AmEx? The inquiry needs to be
manageable, even though it can be quite technical. Further, the existence of
different effects on the two sides of a digital platform, including feedback
effects, complicates the assessment.162 We have always tolerated a significant
amount of inaccuracy in market definition methodologies. Insistence on
precision can become a costly rule of nonliability to the extent that it produces
too many false negatives. Traditional methodologies that require determination
of a relevant market, as the Supreme Court required its AmEx decision,163 are
predictably inaccurate. Further, in differentiated markets, they always serve to
understate market power.164 In this case, the whole point of AmEx’s business
model was its differentiation from alternative cards.
Traditional methods of estimating power from market share of a defined
relevant market are termed “indirect.” The method relies on a link between
market share and market power that is both intuitive and technically capable of
proof.165 The technical proof, however, requires additional information about
both the elasticity of demand of the market in which the firm sells and the
elasticity of supply of competing or fringe firms.166 Even then, it relies on
assumptions about how the firms will behave.167 Indeed, if the full technical

See supra text accompanying notes 117-122.
See JENS-UWE FRANCK & MARTIN PEITZ, CTR. ON REGUL. IN EUR., MARKET DEFINITION
AND MARKET POWER IN THE PLATFORM ECONOMY § 3.6.1, at 63 (2019), https://www.cerre.eu
/sites/cerre/files/2019_cerre_market_definition_market_power_platform_economy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JHK8-SHQT] (describing how to use hypothetical monopolist test with twosided platforms).
163
See discussion supra text accompanying notes 118-124.
164
See David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20
YALE J. ON REGUL. 325, 359-60 (2003) (“Market share as a proxy for market power is
problematic . . . for businesses that compete in multi-sided platform markets.”).
165
E.g., Duncan Cameron & Mark Glick, Market Share and Market Power in Merger and
Monopolization Cases, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 193, 195-96 (1996).
166
Id.; see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases,
94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 944-45 (1981) (asserting that market power can be expressed as a
function of the market’s elasticity of demand, the elasticity of supply of fringe firms, and the
market share).
167
See Cameron & Glick, supra note 165, at 196 (noting the centrality of Cournot
assumptions to the calculus).
161
162
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requirements for deriving power from share were used, proof of power from
market share would be just as technical as direct proof. Because most litigation
does not produce these numbers and judges rarely discuss them in any technical
way, our inferences of power from market share alone are necessarily crude.
Many antitrust decisions do in fact discuss market elasticity of demand and
the elasticity of supply of fringe firms, although almost always nontechnically,
without a numerical measure, and with different terminology. For example,
when a court expresses doubt that a market is well-defined because there seem
to be good user substitutes from outside the proposed market, it is talking about
the market’s elasticity of demand. This was an issue in Federal Trade
Commission v. Whole Foods Market, Inc.,168 in which the court struggled
mightily with the question of whether there was a well-defined market for
“premium natural and organic supermarkets” (“PNOS”) or whether more
traditional grocers should also be included in the defined market.169 To the extent
that customers were sensitive to price and substituted back and forth between
PNOS and traditional markets in response to price changes, the justification for
defining such a market is weaker.170 That is tantamount to saying that a market
defined as PNOS has a relatively high market elasticity of demand.
When a court discusses low barriers to entry or mobility, it is speaking about
elasticity of supply. For example, in Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,171
the Ninth Circuit concluded that self-service, cash-only gasoline retailers was
not an appropriate relevant market for evaluating a predatory pricing claim.172
While customers might have strong preferences for self-service versus fullservice gas retailers, suppliers could readily switch between the two.173 That
conclusion is tantamount to saying that the defined market faces a relatively high
elasticity of supply.
Traditional market definition approaches have the additional liability that they
are always incorrect in product-differentiated or spatially differentiated markets.
Putting differentiated products into separate markets exaggerates power because
168

548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1037 (concluding that narrower market definition was factually justified). Similar
situations include Little Rock Cardiology Clinic PA v. Baptist Health, 591 F.3d 591, 598 (8th
Cir. 2009) (finding that relevant market for medical delivery could not be limited to patients
who had private insurance); and United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1159
(N.D. Cal. 2004) (disagreeing with government that relevant market should be limited to
“high function” financial management software).
170
See Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1041 (holding that FTC had not proven PNOS submarket
but had shown price discrimination between core PNOS customers and those that switched
back and forth between PNOS and traditional markets).
171
51 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1995).
172
Id. at 1437 (finding that relevant market included full-service gasoline retailers).
173
E.g., id. at 1436 (finding that low entry barriers into alleged market for self-serve
gasoline undermined antitrust claim); Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 97
(2d Cir. 1998) (finding that low entry barriers precluded claim that defendant monopolized
market for grocery store sites).
169
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it treats the two goods as if they do not compete with each other at all. By
contrast, putting them into the same market understates power by treating them
as if they were perfect competitors. For example, the “cellophane fallacy,”
named after a monopolization case involving that product, occurs when the
courts place highly differentiated products into the same market and then simply
compute market share by adding up their output on the premise that these diverse
goods are perfect competitors.174 On the other hand, putting two products, such
as cellophane and wax paper, into separate markets treats them as if they do not
compete at all—a conclusion that is equally wrong. For many goods, cellophane
and wax paper may be viable alternative wrapping materials but not for others.
Market definition approaches to the assessment of market power are necessarily
binary, which means that a particular group of sales must be counted as either
inside or outside of the relevant market but not something in between. By
contrast, demand responses to changes in costs or prices can be observed and
metered as finely as the data permit. As a result, if the data are available, they
give a much more accurate assessment of a firm’s market power.
Platforms compete with other platforms as well as nonplatform sellers,175 but
the degree of competition can vary from one situation to another. For some,
product differentiation is extensive, indicating that sellers compete on many
things in addition to price.176 For others, such as Uber and Lyft, the platforms
are more closely similar to one another, making price competition particularly
important.177 People can download apps for both companies at no charge and
readily compare prices before selecting a ride.178 While some users may have
preferences, for the most part they appear to operate as close competitors in those
towns where both are available.179 Any assessment of Uber’s power would
certainly require determining the extent to which other providers such as Lyft or
traditional taxicabs are able to constrain Uber’s power to set a price.
Clearly there is no basis, however, for putting drivers and riders into the same
“market.” It adds nothing to the analysis. Uber’s share could be measured either
174

See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 400 (1956)
(concluding that cellophane was in same market as other flexible wrappings). This holding
was criticized in AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 67, ¶ 534b (“Contrary to the Supreme
Court, there was not a high cross-elasticity of demand between cellophane and other flexible
wrapping materials.”).
175
See supra text accompanying notes 77-83.
176
On this point, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, 130 YALE
L.J. 1901 (2021) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly] (discussing
product differentiation among platforms).
177
See Brett Helling, Uber vs Lyft: A Side-By-Side Comparison for 2021, RIDESTER (Jan.
21, 2021), https://www.ridester.com/uber-vs-lyft/ [https://perma.cc/Z7YE-JV8H] (claiming
that when choosing between ride-sharing services “[t]he only decision you need to make is
choosing Uber vs. Lyft”).
178
See id.
179
See id. (“In many cities across the U.S. and Canada, Uber and Lyft services may seem
practically identical.”).
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by ridership (such as passenger miles or number of fares) or revenue, and these
numbers could be compared with those of Lyft, traditional taxicab drivers, and
perhaps others. For some purposes, such as evaluating restraints on drivers, the
number of drivers might be used. For example, if Uber should impose exclusive
dealing on its drivers by forbidding them from driving for Lyft or a traditional
taxicab company, the challenged restraint would be in the market for drivers and
the questions would properly focus on Uber’s ability to limit the opportunities
of competitors to obtain sufficient drivers. That is so in any exclusive dealing
case, where we ordinarily examine market power in some primary market (such
as power generation) and the extent of exclusion in some secondary market (such
as coal).180 In the Uber situation, the number and availability of riders could be
relevant. For example, scarcity of riders might make an exclusive agreement
more damaging to a rival, while an ample supply of riders would make it less
so. But placing riders and drivers into the same relevant market would not be a
sensible way to address these questions. Indeed, it would make coherent analysis
impossible.
By contrast to market share measures, direct measures of market power need
not require definition of a relevant market at all.181 In addition to their other
advantages, two things point in favor of more direct measurement when the
market in question is a two-sided platform. First, one of the most serious
limitations on the use of direct measurement of power is inadequacy of data.
Two-sided platforms are generally digital, however, and as a result they preserve
fairly complete records of transactions.182 This means that there are typically
useful data about prices, quantities, and shifts in response to changes.183 Second,
the markets are differentiated, some significantly so. This tends to make market
share methodologies unreliable, giving more direct measures a comparative
advantage.184
Direct measurement poses its own complexities. For example, assessing costs
on one side while ignoring the other side is likely to be misleading, particularly
when looking for such things as power or price-cost relationships.185 Even here,
180
E.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 335 (1961) (finding coal
burning electric utility not guilty of unlawful exclusive dealing because its contracts
foreclosed only small percentage of coal market); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra
note 67, ¶ 1821b.
181
Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 459 (2010)
(recognizing “successful efforts to develop[] a number of more direct means of inferring
market power that do not rely on market redefinition”).
182
See Helling, supra note 177 (relying on digital data to compare prices and features of
Uber and Lyft).
183
See id.
184
See Kaplow, supra note 181, at 516 (arguing that “the market definition approach has
another significant defect,” namely that in highly differentiated markets it “uses a subset of
available information and employs it in a manner that reduces the reliability of conclusions
about market power”).
185
See Evans, supra note 164, at 356.
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however, circumstances vary. Some platforms, such as search engines, take no
revenue on the consumer side. As a result, looking at price-cost margins on the
consumer side alone tells us nothing. By contrast, a platform such as eBay
facilitates direct transactions in merchandise between sellers and buyers. In that
case, an examination of a seller’s costs, including its sales commission to eBay,
could be accurate without considering what is happening on the other side.
Notwithstanding the use of a two-sided platform, the sale of a painting on eBay
is not really all that different from any other commission sale.
Direct measures of market power on platforms are probably superior for most
purposes. For both direct and indirect measures, however, effects on the other
must be taken into account. For example, the ability of a platform to increase its
price without changing the terms or incurring increased costs on the other side
is an indicator of power.186 In AmEx, the plaintiff showed that AmEx faced a
low elasticity of demand vis-à-vis its merchants.187 Indeed, the antiswitching
rule was itself a cost to merchants to the extent that it limited their ability to
avoid AmEx’s high transaction fee.188 Further, it could not be understood as a
simple exercise in participation balancing between the two sides because the rule
injured both merchants and cardholders.189
In all events, it is essential that observations of price changes not be limited
to a single side of the market.190 In most cases, effects on the other side of the
platform must be addressed no matter what the methodology for assessing
power. In the AmEx case, direct measures indicated that AmEx had significant
power.191 First, as the government showed, AmEx was able to increase its price
repeatedly without losing sales.192 That fact alone is insufficient. A price
increase on one side may reflect a consumer benefit or cost increase on the other
side. So, we must also consider whether the merchant price increases were
matched by increased perks or other costs of serving customers. If merchant
186

See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2293 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“American Express’ ability to raise merchant prices without losing any meaningful market
share, in the District Court’s view, showed that American Express possessed power in the
relevant market.”).
187
See id. at 2285-86 (majority opinion) (“[T]he fact that two-sided platforms charge one
side a price that is below or above cost reflects differences in the two sides’ demand
elasticity . . . .”).
188
See id. at 2296 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that “[m]erchants upset about a price
increase for merchant-related services cannot avoid that price increase” because of the
antisteering rule).
189
See discussion supra Introduction.B (criticizing dicta in AmEx that two-sided platforms
can only compete with other two-sided platforms).
190
Michael Katz & Jonathan Sallet, Multisided Platforms and Antitrust Enforcement, 127
YALE L.J. 2142, 2159 (2018) (arguing that analysts should “consider price changes on one
side of the platform while holding prices on the other side constant” in order to adequately
“consider cross-platform network effects”).
191
See id.
192
See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2293.
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price increases were not accompanied by changes on the cardholder side of the
market, this suggests that AmEx was seeking out its profit-maximizing price by
raising prices until too many merchants defected.193
Even with the antisteering rule in place, AmEx would not have infinite power
to increase merchant fees. Although under an antisteering rule AmEx customers
would be indifferent to higher merchant fees, merchants would not be. At some
point, the merchants’ costs to carry the AmEx card would become so high that
the merchants themselves would drop it, foregoing whatever prestige or
convenience value the card offered.
D.

Inferring Power from Conduct

Power can often be inferred from the conduct itself. A good example of this
is naked price-fixing. We can infer power from the fact of a naked price fix
because market power is necessary to make it profitable. Given its significant
risks, firms would not do it unless they believed that they could profit from it.
To be sure, the firms might be mistaken, believing that they had power when in
fact they did not. But setting that aside, the existence of naked price-fixing
indicates power. Indeed, we generally define a naked restraint as one that
depends on market power for its success.194 We need not be too concerned about
those cases in which the putative cartel overestimates its power because, in the
case of naked collusion, overdeterrence is not much of a problem.
Returning to the AmEx example, merchant fees are not in and of themselves
an indicator of market power. They are simply the price that the card issuer needs
to charge to make its card profitable.195 Further, a higher merchant fee than other
cards charge is not necessarily an exercise of market power either, because it
may simply reflect higher payouts on the other side in the form of cardholder
benefits.196 But the antisteering rule is different: it prevented a switch away from
the high-priced card even when that switch was profitable to both the merchant

193
See FRANCK & PEITZ, supra note 162, § 3.6.1, at 63 (noting that two-sided platforms
charging both user groups may increase prices until merchants defect in order to seek out
optimal price).
194
See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 67, ¶ 1906a (“We define a particular horizontal
agreement as ‘naked’ if it is formed with the objectively intended purpose or likely effect of
increasing price . . . . [U]nder this definition a naked restraint is a rational act for the
defendants only on the premise that they collectively have sufficient power to affect
marketwide output and price.” (footnote omitted)).
195
See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2288 (“Amex’s increased merchant fees reflect
increases in the value of its services and the cost of its transactions, not an ability to charge
above a competitive price.”).
196
See id. (“Amex uses higher merchant fees to offer its cardholders a more robust rewards
program . . . .”).
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and the customer.197 That rule cannot be justified as creating an offsetting benefit
and must be counted as an exercise in market power.198
The antisteering rule made it impossible for a merchant to steer people to a
less costly card with respect to those transactions where a cardholder would be
inclined to accept the invitation to steer.199 In a competitive market, the effect of
the rule would be that the merchant would drop that card. But the merchants who
carried AmEx felt that they needed to accept the card, notwithstanding its higher
costs. How much they needed it presents a question of degree, but the fact that
AmEx repeatedly increased merchant prices without evidence of offsetting cost
increases or significant defections indicates power.
Under steering, cardholders and customers could negotiate to their joint
profit-maximizing position. Consumers who placed a small value on AmEx’s
benefits could use a cheaper card. For their part, merchants could bargain by
discounting the price or offering collateral services, such as free delivery, to
reflect the merchant costs of a particular payment form. The important thing is
that everything would be discounted into the purchase price. One important
principle is that payment systems should be neutral and transparent, permitting
the parties to negotiate to a mutually beneficial maximum.200 In the process of
injuring its own cardholders, AmEx’s antisteering rule also excluded rival card
platforms that were ready to offer better terms.

197

See discussion supra Section II.A (arguing that the antisteering rule at issue in AmEx
harmed both merchants and card users).
198
See Dennis W. Carlton & Ralph A. Winter, Vertical Most-Favored-Nation Restraints
and Credit Card No-Surcharge Rules, 61 J.L. & ECON. 215, 225 (2018) (arguing that
antisteering “clause allows the monopolist to leverage its market power to exploit the
customers of the competitive good”).
199
Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2280 (“The antisteering provision prohibits merchants
from discouraging customers from using their Amex card after they have already entered the
store and are about to buy something, thereby avoiding Amex’s fee.”).
200
See Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37
RAND J. ECON. 645, 648 (2006).
Neutrality in payment systems. The choice of an interchange fee paid by the
merchant’s bank, the acquirer, to the cardholder’s bank, the issuer, is irrelevant if the
following conditions are jointly satisfied: First, issuers and acquirers pass through the
corresponding charge (or benefit) to the cardholder and the merchant. Second, the
merchant can charge two different prices for goods or services depending on whether the
consumer pays by cash or by card; in other words, the payment system does not impose
a no-surcharge rule as a condition for the merchant to be affiliated with the system. Third,
the merchant and the consumer incur no transaction cost associated with a dual-price
system.
Id. (footnote omitted). As Rochet and Tirole observe, in a properly functioning market,
merchants and customers would move to a wealth-maximizing equilibrium. See id. But the
minimum conditions are that the parties are free to bargain (i.e., there is no prohibition on
steering) and that they have adequate information about the gains that would be available from
trading. See id.

528
E.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101:489

Market Power in Vertical Cases

The AmEx Court held—without citing any economic evidence or literature—
that a relevant market must be established in a vertical case even if alternative
methods of estimating power were available.201 The question was not raised in
the petition for certiorari and was not briefed. The Court’s complete statement
on the issue, including both analysis and conclusion, is contained in this
footnote:
The plaintiffs argue that we need not define the relevant market in this
case because they have offered actual evidence of adverse effects on
competition—namely, increased merchant fees. We disagree. The cases
that the plaintiffs cite for this proposition evaluated whether horizontal
restraints had an adverse effect on competition. Given that horizontal
restraints involve agreements between competitors not to compete in some
way, this Court concluded that it did not need to precisely define the
relevant market to conclude that these agreements were anticompetitive.
But vertical restraints are different. Vertical restraints often pose no risk to
competition unless the entity imposing them has market power, which
cannot be evaluated unless the Court first defines the relevant market.202
In his dissent, Justice Breyer was clearly flummoxed—as if the majority did
not understand that defining a relevant market and direct measurement are
alternative mechanisms for assessing market power.203
Over the last several decades, the usefulness and robustness of direct and
more econometric measures of power that do not depend on a market definition
have become much more practical and prominent.204 They are widely used to
evaluate horizontal mergers threatening anticompetitive unilateral effects.205 As
noted above, however, they have provoked a reaction from some fairly extreme
right-wing groups, although with no economic analysis.206 Apparently this is
because direct measurement provides a way to identify market power in
circumstances where it would be difficult to identify using market share
measures.
201

Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2285 n.7.
Id. (citations omitted).
203
See id. at 2297 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“One critical point that the majority’s argument
ignores is that proof of actual adverse effects on competition is, a fortiori, proof of market
power.”).
204
See discussion supra Introduction.B (noting developments in economic theory over
prior two decades concerning direct measurement of market power from observed
transactional behavior); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 67, ¶¶ 515-521 (tracing
recent developments in direct market analysis); Kaplow, supra note 181, at 459 (discussing
relative strengths and methodologies).
205
Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An
Economic Alternative to Market Definition, 10 B.E. J. THEORETICAL ECON., no. 1, 2010, at 1,
2; see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 67, ¶ 913a.
206
See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
202
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Direct measures of firm responses to changes in demand or cost require
transaction information, so one limitation on their use is the availability of data.
But in the AmEx case, all of the relevant credit card transactions were
digitized.207 Obtaining the data should not pose a significant problem. That is
likely the case on nearly all digital platforms. In any event, direct measures of
power are very likely superior to inferences drawn from market share,
particularly where the products in question are differentiated, as they were in
AmEx.208
Fortunately, there are ways to limit the damage resulting from the Court’s
requirement of a market definition in a vertical case. Direct methodologies can
usually be translated into a conclusion about market boundaries.209 After all, a
market is a grouping of sales for which the firm(s) that control them could
sustainably exact a non-cost-justified price increase above the competitive
level.210 Delineating a relevant market is one way of producing an answer to this
question, although indirectly from inferences about market share. However,
more direct measures can answer the same question as well, through such
devices as estimating the residual elasticity of demand that faces the firm.211
Here, residual elasticity is an estimate of the demand facing an individual firm
after the demand for all of its competitors’ goods has been excluded.212

207
See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2280 (“When a cardholder buys something from a
merchant who accepts Amex credit cards, Amex processes the transaction through its
network . . . .”).
208
See discussion supra Section II.C (arguing that methodologies relying on market
definition understate market power in differentiated markets).
209
Cf. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 67, ¶ 520e (“[D]irect measurement can be an
important step in market delineation and is often used in expert reports on market
definition.”).
210
See id.
211
See id. ¶ 521c.
212
See id. ¶ 521a; Kaplow, supra note 181, at 450 (“The dominant firm’s demand in this
model is often described as a residual demand; it sells only to those who continue to buy the
product (rather than some other product) and are unable to obtain the product from firms in
the competitive fringe.”); see also MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, LECTURES ON ANTITRUST
ECONOMICS 100-14 (2006) (explaining direct method of residual demand estimation and
depicting residual demand function algebraically); Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F.
Bresnahan, Empirical Methods of Identifying and Measuring Market Power, 61 ANTITRUST
L.J. 3, 7 (1992) (“The partial residual demand elasticity measures the extent to which a
particular rival constrains the ability of a given firm to exercise market power.”); Baker &
Bresnahan, supra note 51, at 284 (presenting “a new econometric approach to the problem of
market power estimation, based on specification and estimation of the residual demand
function facing a single firm”). For good historical perspective, see Gregory J. Werden, The
History of Antitrust Market Delineation, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 123 (1992).
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In that case, however, direct measures not only assess the firm’s power but
also can define the boundary of a relevant market.213 For example, if price
change and response data show that a firm has enough power to charge a
monopoly price for product Alpha, we can express that conclusion directly by
saying that the maker of Alpha has a certain amount of power. However, then
we can also say that product Alpha constitutes a relevant market if the difference
between cost and its profit-maximizing price is sufficiently large.
Economic experts assessing unilateral-effects merger cases do a version of
this, which courts have come to recognize, even though they generally go
through the formality of requiring a market definition as well.214 On the one
hand, the methodologies that are used to assess the price effects of a particular
merger in a product-differentiated market do not require a market definition.215
On the other hand, once this methodology is used to predict a price increase of
the necessary magnitude, we can say that the grouping of sales in question
constitutes a relevant market.216
Although the economist need not reach this additional conclusion about the
boundaries of a relevant market in order to predict the price effects of the merger,
she may have to do it in order to satisfy the legal requirement that the price
increase occur in some “line of commerce” and “section of the country,” as
Section 7 of the Clayton Act requires.217 In its Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States218 decision, the Supreme Court equated “line of commerce” with a
product market and “section of the country” with a geographic market.219
Another way of stating this proposition is that a conclusion about market power
based on an econometric measure such as residual demand elasticity becomes
evidence of the proposition that the grouping of sales whose residual elasticity
is low is a relevant market.220

See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 67, ¶ 521c (explaining that direct information
about residual demand curve “can be combined in an equation that will give the residual
demand elasticity, and hence the market power, of the defendant”).
214
Farrell & Shapiro, supra note 205, at 12-14 (analyzing direct measures of firm’s market
power in antitrust evaluation of horizontal mergers as “[m]ore [a]ccurate — [b]ut [m]ore
[c]omplex” while acknowledging that “[a]lternatively, one could perform the traditional
market definition exercise”).
215
See id. at 2 (arguing that “[w]here firms compete to sell differentiated products,” direct
methods are simpler and “more directly based in economics . . . than the market concentration
approach”).
216
See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 67, ¶ 913b.
217
See 15 U.S.C. § 18.
218
370 U.S. 294 (1962).
219
See id. at 324 (“[J]ust as a product submarket may have § 7 significance as the proper
‘line of commerce,’ so may a geographic submarket be considered the appropriate ‘section of
the country.’” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18)); Hovenkamp & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 2015.
220
Cf. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 67, ¶ 913b (“In cases where a merger facilitates
a significant ‘unilateral’ price increase for a grouping of sales that was not an obvious relevant
213
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The court in United States v. H & R Block, Inc.,221 a merger challenge, was
particularly candid about this approach:
“As a matter of applied economics, evaluation of unilateral effects does
not require a market definition in the traditional sense at all.” This is so
because unilateral effects analysis focuses on measuring a firm’s market
power directly by “estimating the change in residual demand facing the
post-merger firm. ‘Residual demand’ refers to the demand for a firm’s
goods after the output of all other competing firms has been taken into
account.” If market power itself can be directly measured or estimated
reliably, then in theory market definition is superfluous, at least as a matter
of economics, because “[i]dentifying a market and computing market
shares provide an indirect means for measuring market power.” . . . As a
legal matter, however, a market definition may be required by Section 7 of
the Clayton Act. The Court is not aware of any modern Section 7 case in
which the court dispensed with the requirement to define a relevant product
market . . . .222
Thus, in a vertical case, as in a horizontal case, a court could consider direct
evidence of market power, which was strong in AmEx, but express that
conclusion in terms of a relevant market.
F.

The Meaning and Scope of Free Riding

The AmEx majority also misunderstood how free riding works. It suggested
that rival card issuers might be taking a free ride on AmEx’s business model,
which relied on high merchant fees with high offsetting rewards to customers.223
The Court apparently believed that a Visa cardholder could free ride on AmEx’s
benefits simply by acquiring a Visa card and keeping it in his pocket.224 In fact,
however, one can obtain the AmEx rewards only by actually using the AmEx
card, and the amount of the award is tied to the amount of the AmEx card
transaction.225

market prior to the merger, the appropriate conclusion is that the merger has identified a new
grouping of sales capable of being classified as a relevant market.”).
221
833 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011).
222
Id. at 84-85 n.35 (first alteration in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting PHILLIP
E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 913a (3d ed. 2007); and then quoting id. ¶ 532a).
223
See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2290 (2018).
224
Id. (arguing that AmEx’s antisteering provision “can prevent retailers from free
riding”).
225
See id. at 2304 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“American Express pays rewards to cardholders
only for transactions in which cardholders use their American Express cards, so if a steering
effort succeeds, no rewards are paid.”); cf. Chi. Pro. Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball
Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 600-01 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that when payments are made in
proportion to how services are delivered, the ride is not free).
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Justice Breyer’s dissent noted the error: “[p]lainly . . . investments tied to card
use . . . are not subject to free-riding.”226 For example, free riding occurs when
one dealer is able to profit from a second dealer’s promotional services because
these services cannot be directly priced into the purchase of the product.227 It
plainly has no application in a case such as AmEx, where card-user benefits were
specifically tied to actual purchases with the AmEx card.228 A cardholder who
wants the additional travel miles that AmEx promises cannot obtain them simply
by owning an AmEx card; she must actually use the card to purchase the airline
ticket.229
The economics of free riding has been used to champion relaxation of antitrust
rules respecting vertical restraints such as resale price maintenance, and with
good results.230 But an essential ingredient in those situations is an investment
whose returns can readily be commandeered by someone else.231 The classic
example is point-of-sale retailer services that must be provided prior to sale and
can be priced only through the product. That enables a competitor to steal the
sale by inducing customers to obtain the services from the full-service dealer but
then to purchase the product at a lower price from the free rider.232 Resale price
maintenance can address this problem by requiring both dealers to charge the
same minimum price. As a result, the customer has no incentive to switch. When
the benefits can be obtained only through purchase of the product, however,
there is no opportunity for free riding. In AmEx, the card services and the sale
are not even capable of being priced out separately. The only way to get the
AmEx services is to use the AmEx cared for the purchase to which the services
apply. Free riding is not possible.

226
Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2304 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (first and second alterations
in original) (quoting United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 237 (E.D.N.Y.
2015)).
227
See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 3, § 11.3.
228
See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2304 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that AmEx tied
its rewards to card use).
229
See id.
230
See Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86,
93-94 (1960) (“Because some retailers bootleg his product to others who resell it without
special services at lower retail prices, the same mechanism of free riding at the expense of
retailers who do provide special services and charge higher prices comes into play. Therefore,
the manufacturer . . . needs to prevent price cutting to induce them to offer special services
jointly with his product.”).
231
See id.
232
See id.
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Marginal vs. Total Effects

Competition occurs at the margin. Marginalism is the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries’ most important contribution to economic analysis.233
Measuring effects at the margin means that one cannot simply look at totals or
averages. Rather, the question is how much a particular act changes a particular
outcome. Speaking about the importance of marginal analysis in law, Judge
Frank Easterbrook observed that “[t]he Court’s efforts to influence future
conduct are doomed unless it appreciates how incentives work. . . . [P]eople
look at marginal rather than average effects.”234 Marginalism in economics is
not one of those things that divides conservatives and moderates. It has become
fundamental to economic analysis of all kinds. Marginalism in economics
enables modern price theory and industrial organization, cost-benefit analysis,
and economic analysis of social cost and externalities.
Antitrust’s rule of reason is in fact a stylized variation of cost-benefit analysis,
with the important qualifier that the fact finder must determine not merely
whether a practice reduces welfare but whether it does so by limiting
competition.235 In the rule of reason antitrust case NCAA v. Board of Regents of
the University of Oklahoma,236 for example, the Court had to determine whether
the competitive harm from a particular rule—limiting teams to four nationally
televised games per year—was justified by some offsetting benefit.237 Because
of limitations in our fact-finding ability, we try to do this without “balancing,”238
but we do so by examining incremental harms and benefits. For example, the
important antitrust question in the NCAA case is not whether the NCAA as an
institution is so competitively harmful that it must be dissolved. That might be
the question in a per se challenge to a cartel. Neither can we say, however, that,
because the NCAA is a good thing, its rule limiting the output of televised games
233
For a history focusing on the United States, see generally HOVENKAMP, OPENING OF
AMERICAN LAW, supra note 3.
234
Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 33 (1984) (“[People] substitute among opportunities until they receive approximately
the same reward from each of their activities (whether buying or doing). They buy or do a
little more of one thing and a little less of something else until it is not worthwhile to make
further changes. At that point the marginal gains of each activity are approximately the same.
Change the returns on the margin and people alter their behavior; change the returns
somewhere inside the margin and people are unlikely to alter their behavior in the desired
way — if at all.”); see also id. at 13 (criticizing court that “sees only the gross effects —
averages rather than the margins on which people are trading”).
235
See, e.g., Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (“To determine
whether a restraint violates the rule of reason, . . . the plaintiff has the initial burden to prove
that the challenged restraint has a substantial anticompetitive effect that harms consumers in
the relevant market.”).
236
468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984).
237
Id. (describing “essential” antitrust inquiry as “whether or not the challenged restraint
enhances competition”).
238
See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 67, ¶ 1507.
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is just fine. One must gauge the marginal anticompetitive effects of the
challenged rule against any marginal benefits offered for it.
The AmEx majority lost sight of the fact that effects at the margin are what
counts. This would involve, first, assessing the marginal harms to competition
caused by the antisteering rule and then looking for offsetting benefits from that
rule that might serve to justify it. What marginalist analysis does not do is look
at the entire enterprise or business model, proclaim it a good thing, and be
finished.
The AmEx majority wrote,
Amex’s higher merchant fees are based on a careful study of how much
additional value its cardholders offer merchants. On the other side of the
market, Amex uses its higher merchant fees to offer its cardholders a more
robust rewards program, which is necessary to maintain cardholder loyalty
and encourage the level of spending that makes Amex valuable to
merchants. That Amex allocates prices between merchants and cardholders
differently from Visa and MasterCard is simply not evidence that it wields
market power to achieve anticompetitive ends.239
However, the challenge in this case was not to AmEx’s overall business
model, which we can presume offered cardholders in the aggregate overall value
in excess of overall costs. For example, in the NCAA case, the challenge was not
to the legitimacy of the NCAA or its business model. Rather, it was to the
incremental effect of a limitation on each member team’s televised games.240
By the same token, the question in AmEx was not whether AmEx’s business
model requiring higher fees in exchange for larger cardholder benefits was
anticompetitive. Rather, it was whether the antisteering rule produced
incremental harms to competition that were greater than any incremental
benefits. The people affected by steering would be those marginal customers
who would have accepted a steering offer had it been made, as well as those
merchants who would have profited by incentivizing a customer to switch to a
lower price card.
The Second Circuit had also confused the question of total versus marginal
effects: “Because the NDPs affect competition for cardholders as well as
merchants, the Plaintiffs’ initial burden was to show that the NDPs made all
Amex consumers on both sides of the platform—i.e., both merchants and
cardholders—worse off overall.”241 But “all consumers” is clearly wrong. Many

239

Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2288 (citations omitted).
NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99 (“By restraining the quantity of television rights available for
sale, the challenged practices create a limitation on output . . . .”); see also AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 67, ¶¶ 1502-1504, 1511.
241
United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 205 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom.
Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). The Second Circuit used the term
“nondiscriminatory provisions,” or NDPs, to describe AmEx’s policies “barring merchants
from (1) offering customers any discounts or nonmonetary incentives to use credit cards less
240
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customers were not affected at all. For example, the restraint on the number of
televised games in the NCAA case did not affect those who did not watch any
televised games. Rules imposing resale price maintenance affect only
discounters that would otherwise charge a lower price. Standard-setting and
other boycott rules affect only producers at risk of violating a standard.242 The
marginal cardholders in the AmEx case were those who would have switched in
response to a steering offer because they valued the switch more than the
foregone AmEx perks.
When the government is seeking an injunction against a practice rather than
complete destruction of the defendant’s business method, then the issue is
limited to the competitive effect of that particular rule. Here, the affected
customers were those that would have switched to a less costly card but for the
anti-steering rule. The value that they placed on the defendant’s perks was less
than the incremental price to merchants of using the AmEx card.243
As the district court observed, other AmEx cardholders would decline the
merchant’s offer to switch because, for them, the value of the perks was at least
as high as the merchant’s acceptance fee, or at least as high as that portion of the
fee that the merchant offered them for switching.244 Of course, these cardholders
were unaffected by the antisteering rule. Cardholders whose behavior was
actually changed by the rule were worse off, thus creating lost value on both
sides of the platform.
A factual finding that the Supreme Court did not disturb was that merchants
passed on AmEx’s higher fees through higher product prices across the board.
Because merchants could not price discriminate between customers who used
an AmEx card and those who used a cheaper card, these higher prices affected
even people who did not use the AmEx card at all.245 While this factual finding
is certainly troubling, it was not necessary to condemn the antisteering rule and
is thus something of a red herring. The question is whether consumer effects “at
the margin” were harmful, and for this the place to look is those consumers who
were affected by it.

costly for merchants to accept, (2) expressing preferences for any card, or (3) disclosing
information about the costs of different cards to merchants who accept them.” Id. at 184.
242
See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 67, ¶ 2231.
243
See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
244
United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 220 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“[E]ven
if a merchant is inclined to steer away from American Express, the cardholder would still
have the freedom to use an Amex card if the cardholder decides the rewards offered by
American Express are of greater value than the discount, in-kind perk, or other benefit offered
by the merchant.”), rev’d on other grounds, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio
v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
245
Id. at 208 (“[I]nflated merchant discount rates are passed on to all customers—Amex
cardholders and non-cardholders alike—in the form of higher retail prices.”); id. at 215-18
(discussing how antisteering rules have resulted in higher prices to both merchants and
consumers).
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Competition and “Welcome Acceptance”

One of the most fundamental principles of economics is that market
participants are rational actors, which means that they maximize their profits
within the array of choices that they are presented.246 Given appropriate
information, they will make decisions that maximize their own value. In
defending the antisteering rule, the Court concluded that a dealer offering a
customer a discount for purchasing with an alternative card “undermines the
cardholder’s expectation of ‘welcome acceptance’—the promise of a frictionless
transaction.”247 “A lack of welcome acceptance at one merchant makes a
cardholder less likely to use Amex at all other merchants.”248 The Court
described this lack of welcome acceptance as an “externality [that] endangers
the viability of the entire Amex network.”249
It is difficult to come up with a more antimarket rationale than this one.
Informing a customer about a cheaper alternative is neither an externality nor an
affront to consumer rationality. It is in fact fundamental to the workings of
competitive markets. To be sure, telling a consumer about to buy a name brand
that the house or generic brand is cheaper might hinder the consumer’s
“welcome acceptance” of the name brand—but that is simply the way
competition works.
The “welcome acceptance” argument is impossible to harmonize with the
premise that consumers make choices in a way that maximizes their own
welfare. “Welcome acceptance” in this case apparently meant that the buyer
should be prevented from even knowing that a cheaper alternative was available.
The Second Circuit had decided that permitting consumers to make informed
choices about options was generally desirable but that “welcome acceptance”
could be a viable defense on a credit card platform because loss of a sale via
steering could have a negative impact on both sides.250
Certainly, loss of “welcome acceptance” on one product could undermine a
firm’s business model by impairing earnings elsewhere. For example, a
consumer induced to buy an electric automobile after a dealer’s comparisons of
gasoline and electric vehicles might impact the market for gasoline. The Court
seemed to think that providing a consumer with a better deal in a primary good
was a bad thing if it had an impact on some secondary good. By contrast, the
246

See, e.g., MARTIN KOLMAR, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS: AN INTEGRATIVE
APPROACH 269-70 (2017).
247
Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2289 (quoting Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 156).
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
See United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F. 3d 179, 191 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Although
merchants across various industries regularly try to ‘steer’ their customers toward certain
purchasing decisions via strategic product placement, discounts, and other deals, steering
within the credit-card industry can be harmful insofar as it interferes with a network’s ability
to balance its two-sided net price.”), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274
(2018).
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district court took the only economically rational view of the situation:
“Allowing merchants to actively participate in their customers’ point-of-sale
decisions would remove the artificial barrier that now segregates merchant
demand from the price of network services . . . .”251
*****
Do Apple v. Pepper and AmEx signal a new direction among the majority of
the Supreme Court, in which fidelity to fundamental economics is no longer
important? It may be too early to say, but these two opinions are not very
encouraging. The Supreme Court in the 1960s was rightfully accused of
torturing economics to any degree necessary to achieve a preconceived result.
Today, it seems to be doing a new version of the same thing.252
III. ATTACKING BIGNESS OR PROTECTING CONSUMERS?
Antitrust policy’s leftward tail also suffers from deficiencies in economic
reasoning, although very different ones. In their favor, they do a better job than
the right does of acknowledging that the United States is experiencing a
monopoly problem, reflected in unreasonably high price-cost margins,253 a
declining share of labor participation, and higher concentration.254 However,
some of the proposed solutions are policy misfires, likely to make the problem
worse rather than better. These result in large part from lack of careful economic
analysis.
The principal goal of antitrust policy under the consumer welfare principle is
to facilitate markets that produce maximum output consistent with sustainable
competition.255 High output benefits consumers through lower prices, but it also
benefits labor and other input suppliers who have more business as output
increases. The proposals addressed here cannot be understood as attempts to
achieve this goal. Rather, they are pursuing something else—perhaps size for its
251

Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 220-21.
See Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 10, at 1848 (commenting that judicial
enforcement of antitrust policy in the mid-twentieth century was “excessively interventionist.
Courts often either used no economics or poor economics to make decisions”).
253
See Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 714, 738
(2018).
254
See, e.g., NANCY L. ROSE, CONCERNS ABOUT CONCENTRATION (2019),
https://economicstrategygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Maintaining-the-Strengthof-American-Capialism-Concerns-About-Concentration.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9MA-Q8R9]
(summarizing economic data and conclusions regarding concentration); see also GREG
JENSEN, ATUL NARAYAN, OLIVER SIMON & LAUREN FORMAN, BRIDGEWATER ASSOCS., PEAK
PROFIT MARGINS? A US PERSPECTIVE (2019), https://www.bridgewater.com/researchlibrary/daily-observations/peak-profit-margins-a-us-perspective/peak-profit-margins-a-usperspective.pdf.
255
On the meaning of this definition, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Harm and
Causation, 99 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
252
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own sake, or perhaps a kind of tort theory of harm to rivals. Whatever their true
purpose may be, they are not defensible as antitrust policy.
A.

Mergers and Consumer Welfare

Senators Cory Booker, Richard Blumenthal, Amy Klobuchar, and Edward
Markey are cosponsors of merger legislation256 that is focused far too much on
increased concentration or absolute size for its own sake and too little on the
threat of consumer harm.257 Indeed, one portion of the bill would pursue mergers
of very large firms simply because they are large, regardless of concentration or
predicted impact on prices and even if the firms are not competitors.258
Such a bill needs a coherent theory of economic harm, or else explicit
recognition that it is giving up on an economic approach to merger law
altogether. On the one hand, the link between concentration and high margins is
provable.259 On the other, the link between absolute size and prices is not proven.
An economic basis for pursuing conglomerate mergers or other mergers between
noncompetitors may exist, but it is not articulated in this bill. One strong
possibility, which policy makers need to take more seriously, is large digital

256
Consolidation Prevention and Competition Promotion Act of 2019, S. 307, 116th Cong.
(2019).
257
See Hovenkamp & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 2021-24.
258
In a case brought by the United States, the Federal Trade Commission, or a State
attorney general, a court shall determine that the effect of an acquisition described in this
section may be materially to lessen competition or create a monopoly or a monopsony
if—
....
(B)(i) as a result of such acquisition, the acquiring person would hold an aggregate
total amount of the voting securities and assets of the acquired person in excess of
$5,000,000,000 (as adjusted and published for each fiscal year beginning after
September 30, 2020, . . . to reflect the percentage change in the gross national product
for such fiscal year compared to the gross national product for the year ending September
30, 2019); or
(ii)(I) the person acquiring or the person being acquired has assets, net annual sales,
or a market capitalization greater than $100,000,000,000 (as so adjusted and published);
and
(II) as a result of such acquisition, the acquiring person would hold an aggregate total
amount of the voting securities and assets of the acquired person in excess of
$50,000,000 (as so adjusted and published) . . . .
S. 307, § 3; see also Hovenkamp & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 2023 (“This provision does not
require that the merging firms be competitors or potential competitors, or even in a suppliercustomer relationship, provided the size thresholds are met.”).
259
Hovenkamp & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 2001 (discussing presumption that “more
concentrated markets tend to have higher prices and higher price-cost margins, all else
equal”).
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platform acquisitions of small firms, many of which are noncompetitors. These
are not singled out in this bill.260
Many of the conglomerate merger cases that have actually been litigated
involved firms making complementary products. Such mergers can definitely
create advantages over rivals. Just as vertical mergers, they eliminate the need
for market transactions and much of the coordination that use of the market
entails. For example, they can enable purchasers to buy a completed product or
a full line.
What a new statute should require, however, is some theory that serves to
explain when such mergers can result in reduced output and higher prices.
Indeed, the approach taken in the recently released Vertical Merger Guidelines
could be extended to at least some conglomerate mergers.261 No theory of
competitive harm is offered in the proposed bill, however, other than the fact
that firms are becoming too large. The first and most obvious consequence of
mergers of complements is better coordination and reduced costs and, thus,
benefits to consumers. As in the case of vertical mergers, condemnation should
be the exception rather than the rule, although exceptional cases certainly exist.
Such mergers were occasionally condemned in the 1960s, but largely on
indefensible economic theories. In Federal Trade Commission v. Procter &
Gamble Co.,262 the Supreme Court condemned a merger between a maker of
household cleansers and a maker of household bleach (Clorox). The defendants
raised efficiencies as a defense.263 In this case, the merger enabled the firm to
market and advertise a full line of household cleaning and laundry products and
to create economies of scale in advertising and purchasing.264 Speaking for the

260
On these acquisitions, see Hovenkamp, supra note 176. Another possibility is
“portfolio theory,” accepted in one case by the European Commission but not currently
accepted in the United States. See Commission Decision on General Electric/Honeywell, 2001
O.J. (L 48) [hereinafter GE/Honeywell]; Götz Drauz, Unbundling GE/Honeywell: The
Assessment of Conglomerate Mergers Under EC Competition Law, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
885, 897-901 (2002). For a less favorable assessment, see Eric S. Hochstadt, The Brown Shoe
of European Union Competition Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 390 (2002) (suggesting that
the GE/Honeywell decision was motivated by EU’s concern for protecting competitors
generally). Another possibility is some variation of the “potential competition” doctrines,
which do not reach all conglomerates but only those that eliminate the opportunities for
potential competition. In any event, those theories have not been applied in the United States
for decades. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 67, ¶¶ 1121-1135 (assessing “perceived
potential entrant” doctrine and “actual potential entrant” doctrine).
261
U.S. DOJ & FTC, supra note 159, § 1 (outlining “the principal analytical techniques,
practices, and enforcement policies of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission . . . with respect to a range of transactions often described as vertical mergers
and acquisitions”).
262
386 U.S. 568 (1967).
263
Id. at 574 (explaining that defendant chose to acquire Clorox because of benefit to both
companies relative to sales, distribution, manufacturing, and marketing efforts).
264
See id. at 599-601 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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majority, Justice Douglas did not reject the factual basis for these claims. Rather,
the Court held that “[p]ossible economies cannot be used as a defense to
illegality.”265 The Court did not really condemn the merger because it created
these efficiencies but rather held that if the merger appeared anticompetitive on
other grounds (in this case, the elimination of potential competition) then Procter
& Gamble could not raise efficiency as a defense.266
In Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. White Consolidated Industries,
Inc.,267 another merger of complements, the Third Circuit went further. It
condemned the merger of a firm that made steel rolling mills and a firm that
made the electric wiring installations for such mills. A complete installation
required one mill plus one wiring harness, so the two entities were perfect
complements. The court offered the theory that the merger would create “the
only company capable of designing, producing and installing a complete metal
rolling mill,” and this “would raise higher the already significant barriers to the
entry of others” into the market.268 That analysis effectively made competitors
the beneficiaries and consumers the victims of merger policy.
B.

Segregating Platform Sales

A proposal endorsed by Senator Elizabeth Warren during her presidential
campaign was focused less on mergers and more on dominant firms—in
particular, the large digital platforms. She proposed that large Internet sellers,
such as Amazon, be prevented from selling both their own products and those
of competing sellers on the same platform.269 More thought should have been
given to the impact of such a policy on competition or consumers or, for that
matter, even to identifying who is injured when a firm such as Amazon sells
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Id. at 580.
Id. at 578-80 (concluding that the merger was fraught with illegally anticompetitive
effects).
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414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969).
268
Id. at 518. GE/Honeywell, supra note 260, reached a somewhat similar conclusion in
the EU.
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See Elizabeth Warren, Here’s How We Can Break Up Big Tech, MEDIUM (Mar. 8,
2019),
https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech9ad9e0da324c [https://perma.cc/DM3U-69SW] (suggesting breaking up large entities in tech
sector and passing “legislation that requires large tech platforms to be designated as ‘Platform
Utilities’ and broken apart from any participant on that platform”). This also appears to be an
element in an antitrust case that the EU Competition Authority recently brought against
Google, although at this time it is not clear that the EU will insist on separation of in-house
and third-party sales. Rather, the press release makes the weaker statement that “[d]ata on the
activity of third party sellers should not be used to the benefit of Amazon when it acts as a
competitor to these sellers.” See European Commission Press Release IP/20/2077, Antitrust:
Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Amazon for the Use of Non-Public
Independent Seller Data and Opens Second Investigation into its E-Commerce Business
Practices (Nov. 10, 2020).
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both its own house brands and the brands of rivals in close comparison on the
same site.
Many of the brands that compete with Amazon’s own brands are sold by large
firms, and often at margins that are significantly higher than Amazon’s margins.
For example, Amazon sells its own AmazonBasics batteries in competition with
brands that include Delco, Duracell, Energizer, and Rayovac. It sells
AmazonBasics toasters in competition with Black & Decker, Hamilton Beach,
and KitchenAid (owned by Whirlpool). It sells AmazonBasics plastic storage
containers in competition with brands that include Anchor Hooking, Glad, and
Rubbermaid. AmazonBasics office supplies sell in competition with 3M, whose
competing products include Post-It notes and Scotch Tape.
Forcibly separating Amazon’s brands from the offerings of these companies
will almost certainly reduce downward pricing pressure on these national name
brands, resulting in higher prices for consumers. Few small firms will be
benefitted. Most of the benefits will accrue to companies like 3M (the largest
maker of office supplies in the United States), Berkshire Hathaway (who owns
Duracell), Black & Decker (America’s largest manufacturer of small appliances
and power tools), or Samsonite (the world’s largest luggage manufacturer,
which competes with AmazonBasics luggage).
At the same time, under the Warren proposal, Amazon could sell
AmazonBasics or its other store brands only on a separate website. If it chose to
do so, there would of course be less competitive pressure on their prices as well.
As a result, prices on both the third-party website and the Amazon products
website would rise. Of course, each platform would be smaller to the extent that
it would not carry the products on the other platform.
I doubt very much that Senator Warren is consciously pursuing a policy of
enriching Berkshire-Hathaway, Black & Decker, or 3M at the expense of
consumers. More likely, her advisors were so fixated on the rhetoric of bigness
that they never sat down to figure out who was getting harmed or benefitted by
this proposal.
To be sure, some small sellers would fare better if Amazon’s website did not
offer their goods in competition with Amazon brands. Senator Warren’s
proposal would have affected, as an example, a laptop computer stand sold on
Amazon by Rain Design, a relatively small firm, at a price that hovers between
$40 and $43.270 Amazon offers its own, somewhat different rival stand at about
half that price, $19.99.271 Several other companies offer similar stands on
270

See Spencer Soper, Got a Hot Seller on Amazon? Prepare for E-Tailer to Make One
Too, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 20, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2016-04-20/got-a-hot-seller-on-amazon-prepare-for-e-tailer-to-make-one-too (discussing
the effect of AmazonBasics products on companies like Rain Design); Rain Design 10032
mStand Laptop Stand, Silver (Patented), AMAZON, https://smile.amazon.com /Rain-DesignmStand-Laptop-Patented/dp/B000OOYECC/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=rain
+design+laptop+stand&qid=1577046924&sr=8-1 (last visited Feb. 15, 2021).
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AmazonBasics Laptop Desk Stand for PC and Macbook - Silver, AMAZON,
https://smile.amazon.com/AmazonBasics-DSN-01750-SL-Laptop-Stand-Silver/dp/B00WR

542

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101:489

Amazon, most of them cheaper than the Rain Design stand. A search for
“adjustable laptop stand” reveals more than twenty similar, though
distinguishable, products ranging in price from roughly $19 to roughly $45. Rain
Design is near the top of that range and the AmazonBasics product near the
bottom. While the products perform the same general function, they are
differentiated, which means that different customers might value one over the
other.
Several things are wrong with this proposal. First, there is no evidence
indicating whether the most likely competitors of Amazon’s store brands are
small firms, like Rain Design, or much larger firms, like Berkshire-Hathaway,
Samsonite, or 3M. There does not appear to be a good study on the issue.
However, basic economics suggest that Amazon will introduce its own house
brands in areas that offer promising opportunities for entry and profit. These
would be markets characterized by a large sales volume and high margins in
relation to the entry investment. The promises of high volume and a high markup
on existing products are common inducements to entry. Further, the market for
household batteries or consumer luggage is undoubtedly many times larger than
the market for laptop stands.
Second, no claim is made that the AmazonBasics’s laptop stand infringes
upon a utility patent, a design patent, or any other IP right owned by Rain
Design.272 Before we can declare as “unfair” one firm’s design of a lower cost
(or lower margin) product, we must have some criterion of fairness.273 In this
case, protecting consumers from high prices does not appear to be one of them,
but protecting a seller’s high margins from rivals willing to sell a noninfringing
product for less apparently is.
Suppose we forced Amazon to discontinue sales of either the Rain Design
stand or the AmazonBasics stand. Amazon would almost certainly dump Rain
Design. The principal impact would be that Rain Design could no longer sell its
stand on the Amazon website. No one seems to have thought about that. Indeed,
it replays an error that antitrust well-wishers have committed time and time
again. In an effort to protect small businesses, the courts fashioned harsh rules

DS0AU/ref=sr_1_11?keywords=rain+design+laptop+stand&qid=1577047065&sr=8-11
(last visited Feb. 15, 2021).
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The Amazon entry for the Rain Design stand indicates that it is patented but does not
claim infringement against Amazon. However, Rain Design has sued another firm for
trademark, trade dress, copyright, and patent infringement of a product identified as a laptop
stand. See Rain Design, Inc. v. Spinido, Inc., No. 17-cv-03681, 2018 WL 4904894, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2018) (dismissing complaint on jurisdictional grounds). For more details,
see generally Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Default
Judgment, Rain Design, Inc., 2018 WL 7138290 (No.17-cv-03681).
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Cf. Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 464 (1941)
(condemning effort by fashion manufacturers to create their own IP system and enforce it via
store boycotts).
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condemning such practices as exclusive dealing274 or maximum resale price
maintenance275 where no injury to competition was in sight. The effect of these
antitrust rules was to make dealing with independent small firms so costly that
the larger businesses opted instead not to deal with them at all. The result was to
make life even more difficult for the small businesses that the courts intended to
protect.
Amazon’s practice of selling both its own products and those of rivals in close
juxtaposition almost certainly benefits consumers by permitting close price
comparisons. When Amazon introduces a product such as AmazonBasics AAA
batteries in competition with Duracell, prices will go down. There is no evidence
to suggest that the practice is so prone to abuse or so likely to harm consumers
in other ways that it should be categorically condemned. Rather, it is an act of
partial vertical integration similar to other practices that the antitrust laws have
confronted and allowed in the past. One close analogy is dual distribution, which
occurs when a firm sells through both independent franchisees and its wholly
owned stores.276 Such practices nearly always increase output, benefitting
consumers and typically even independent competing firms.
An important lesson from the history of antitrust enforcement is that one must
always consider how a firm will respond to an antitrust decree. For example,
telling a firm such as Amazon that it may no longer sell its own AmazonBasics
toaster on its website in competition with toasters made by Black & Decker,
Cuisinart, or Sunbeam requires Amazon to choose among several options: it
might (1) produce a second website, offering its own products on one and
products sold by third-party vendors on the other; (2) exit from the market for
its own brands and sell only the brands of other firms; or (3) do just the opposite,
terminating its sales arrangements with third-party firms and selling only its
house brands. Amazon would take the most profitable course. Option (1) would
benefit the outside sellers because they would no longer have to compete with
Amazon on the same website. Option (2) would also clearly benefit the outside
sellers because they would not have to compete with Amazon at all. Option (3)
would harm the outside sellers because they could no longer sell on any Amazon
website. None of these options benefits consumers. Output is likely to go down

274
See Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 319-20 (1949) (Douglas,
J.) (objecting that condemning exclusive dealing under aggressive standard would force
refiners to build their own gasoline stations and cease dealing with independents); see also
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business Firm: 1880–1960, 95
IOWA L. REV. 863, 884 (2010) (agreeing with Standard Oil dissent and stating that “legal
policy often had the perverse effect of destroying the very small businesses it was intended to
protect”).
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Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153 (1968) (condemning newspaper’s limits on
prices charged by delivery agents); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 274, at 907 (“Albrecht
virtually guaranteed that large numbers of manufacturers would simply stop using
independent dealer networks and switch to ownership vertical integration.”).
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See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 3, § 11.6e.
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and prices up under all of them, for each reduces the amount of competition
between Amazon and outside vendors.
Antitrust under the consumer welfare standard would find all of these options,
if forced by a court decree, unacceptable. Under a different standard, such as
protecting third-party businesses, different outcomes would affect them in
different ways. Here, it is important to keep in mind that most of these businesses
are not small, although they are smaller than Amazon. Second, we would not
know how small businesses would be affected unless we could predict which of
these options Amazon would choose.277 That is very likely a problem in
predicting Amazon’s profit-maximizing option or options. For that, economics
would be essential no matter what our underlying goal.
Finally, while no good case can be made for structural separation of inside
and outside sales, agreements that involve third-party vendors are still subject to
Section 1 of the Sherman Act and, in some cases, Sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton
Act. Here the antitrust laws can exercise essential control. Practices such as
exclusive dealing, loyalty discounts, or most favored nations are remediable, as
are anticompetitive acquisitions, but only provided that they are shown to cause
reduced output, higher prices, or some other consumer harm. Lawsuits filed in
late 2020 against Google and Facebook by federal and state antitrust enforcers
allege a variety of these.278 Misuses of information provided by third-party
sellers might also be actionable, under either competition or consumer protection
standards. The result in nearly all cases finding an antitrust violation would be
an injunction. These solutions are less dramatic but likely to be much more
effective.279
CONCLUSION
When used correctly and without excessive ideology, economics is a
powerful, neutral tool for assessing injuries to competition and identifying
appropriate fixes. Indeed, that is the first and best use of antitrust economics. It
does not always require difficult mathematics or highly technical analysis but
sometimes just informed common sense about how markets work and who is
affected by policy changes. As described above, both the right and the left have
ignored the first rule of rational antitrust policy: figure out who is getting hurt,
and how. Fundamental to this inquiry is proper segregation of questions of fact
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For a discussion of various options, see Patrick F. Todd, Digital Platforms and the
Leverage Problem, 98 NEB. L. REV. 486, 491 (2019) (“[A]ll three of these proposals, to
varying degrees, would abandon the interests of consumers in favor of less efficient small
businesses, at the expense of consumer welfare.”).
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See generally Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, supra note 176.
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such a proposal, see Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, supra note 176
(manuscript at 78).
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from questions of law or policy. The latter is too often just ideology by another
name.
Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinions in Apple v. Pepper paid much
attention to the factual question of who is harmed as an injury is passed along
from a cartel or monopolist to its successive purchasers. The majority in AmEx
seemed so taken with two-sided markets, the latest shiny object among market
theories, that it abandoned careful market analysis in order to assess harms and
benefits. The progressive proposals for mergers and platform separation fare no
better. Proposals like the one calling for the separation of platforms and thirdparty markets seem calculated to harm precisely the people they are intended to
benefit.

